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Problems for Captive Ratepayers in
Nonunanimous Settlements of Public
Utility Rate Cases
Stefan H. Kriegert

Professor Krieger discusses the recent tendency of public utility
commissions to approve nonunanimous settlements of rate cases without
full hearings. With the rising interest in alternative dispute resolution
methods and the pressing demands of increasingly complex rate cases, a
number of public utility commissions have encouraged negotiated
settlement of rate cases. In many instances, commissions have approved
these settlements over the strenuous objections of consumer groups.
ProfessorKrieger argues that in the current regulatory environment, the
nonunanimous settlement trend poses significant dangers. The
nonunanimous settlement process raises the risk that the burden of
increased utility prices will be borne disproportionately by captive
residentialand low-income ratepayers. ProfessorKrieger concludes that
requiring unanimous settlement is necessary to protect these less powerful
groups.
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Introduction
During the past thirty years, scholars and practitioners have shown
an increased interest in the development of alternatives to traditional

litigation as a means for resolving disputes.' The literature is replete with
discussions of various alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms.
These mechanisms include negotiation, mediation, arbitration, mini-trials,
and summary jury trials. 2 A number of commentators have noted the
advantages these methods have over traditional adjudication. Among these
benefits are the saving of time and money; 3 the flexibility and creative

1. STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 3-7 (2d ed. 1992); Robert
D. Raven, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Expanding Opportunities, ARB. J., June 1988,
at 44; see Kathleen Sampson, Exploring the Issues in Private Judging, Panel Discussion at
the American Judicature Society's Annual Meeting (Aug. 7, 1993) (edited transcript), in 77
JUDICATURE 203 (1994); see also Talbot D'Alemberte, ADR Has Come Into Its Own, ARB.
J., Mar. 1991, at 3, 60; Robert B. McKay, The Many Uses of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, ARB. J., Sept. 1985, at 12 (discussing the "dramatic expansion of ADR");
Richard A. Salem, The Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement: An Overview, ARB. J.,
Sept. 1985, at 3.
2.

DONOVAN LEISURE NEWTON & IRVINE, ADR PRACTICE BOOK §§ 1.1-11.7 (John

H. Wilkinson ed., 1990 & Supp. 1993); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 7-13; see
SUSAN M. LEESON &BRYAN M. JOHNSTON, ENDING IT: DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA
(1988); LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS
(1987); see also JAY FOLBERG &ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE
TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION (1984). See generally THE POLITICS OF
INFORMAL JUSTICE (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) [hereinafter POLITICS OF INFORMAL
JUSTICE].

3. DONOVAN LEISURE NEWTON & IRVINE, supra note 2, §§ 2.2-.3; see Tom Arnold,
Fundamentals ofAlternative Dispute Resolution: Why PreferADR, in 2 PATENT LITIGATION
1993, at 655 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series
No. 376, 1993); David C. Bergmann, ADR: Resolution or Complication?, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Jan. 15, 1993, at 20; Richard M. Berman, Rate Regulation: Cable TVis Ready for
ADR, ARB. J., June 1993, at 70, 71 (1993) (discussing the advantages of arbitration);
Sampson, supra note 1, at 203; Lloyd N. Shields, Why Attorneys Use ADR, 41 LA. B.J. 222
(1993). But see Gail Bingham & Leah V. Haygood, Environmental Dispute Resolution: The
FirstTen Years, ARB. J., Dec. 1986, at 3, 12-13 (discussing environmental dispute resolution
as not being comparable to litigation when evaluating cost and time savings).
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responsiveness of alternative processes; 4 the achievement of results that
better serve the needs of the parties;5 the enhancement of community

involvement in the dispute resolution process; 6 the reduction of court
caseloads; 7 and broader access to the justice system.8 Given these
purported benefits, proposals have been made suggesting the use of ADR
to resolve a wide range of disputes that are traditionally adjudicated in the
courts. These range from consumer cases 9 and housing disputes'I to

divorce" and domestic violence actions. 2 Authors have also called for
the use of ADR processes in such complex fields as environmental 3 and
nuclear energy regulation.t4
4. DONOVAN LEISURE NEWTON & IRVINE, supra note 2, § 2.5; see Bergmann, supra
note 3, at 20; Sampson, supra note 1, at 203; J. Walton Blackburn, Environmental Mediation
as an Alternative to Litigation, 16 POL'Y STUD. J. 562, 563 (1988); Raven, supra note 1,
at 44, 46.
5. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 5; see also Miriam K. Mills, Overview and
Implications of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 16 POL'Y STUD. J. 493 (1988).
6. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 5; see also Alfred A. Marcus et al., The
Applicability of Regulatory Negotiation to Disputes Involving the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 213, 214 (1984).
7. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 5; Bergmann, supra note 3, at 20; Sampson,
supra note 1, at 203.
8. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 5-7.
9. Id. at 389-91; see Ronald J. Adams, Consumer Complaint Arbitration: The
Corporate View, ARB. J., Dec. 1988, at 41.
10. See Lauren J. Resnick, Mediating Affordable Housing Disputes in Massachusetts:
Optimal Intervention Points, ARB. J., June 1990, at 15.
11. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, A ConsiderationofAlternatives to DivorceLitigation,
1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119; Joyce Hauser-Dann, Divorce Mediation: A Growing Field?,
ARB. J., June 1988, at 15; Steven T. Knuppel, Promise and Problems in Divorce Mediation,
1991 J. DisP. RESOL. 127; David Singer, Mediation-A Growing Meansfor Settling Divorce
Conflicts, ARB. J., Dec. 1992, at 21.
12. Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in
Domestic Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117 (1993).
13. See Douglas J. Amy, The Politicsof Environmental Mediation, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q.
1 (1983); Blackburn, supra note 4; Stephen Crable, ADR: A Solution for Environmental
Disputes, ARB. J., Mar. 1993, at 24; Alfred Levinson, Environmental Dispute Resolution
and Policy Making, 16 POL'Y STUD. J. 575 (1988); John P. McCrory, Environmental
Mediation-Another Piecefor the Puzzle, 6 VT. L. REV. 49 (1981); Barry G. Rabe, The
Politicsof Environmental Dispute Resolution, 16 POL'Y STUD. J. 585 (1988); David Singer,
The Use of ADR Methods in Environmental Disputes, ARB. J., Mar. 1992, at 55; Bruce
Stiftel & Neil G. Sipe, Mediation of Environmental Enforcement: Overcoming Inertia, 1992
J. DISP. RESOL. 303; Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability
Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1 (1981).
14. See, e.g., Marcus et al., supra note 6.

Public Utility Rate Cases
ADR has recently been touted as an answer to problems in public
utility regulation. Traditionally, public utility rates are set in formal
adjudicatory hearings in which all parties, primarily utilities and different
classes of ratepayers, have the right to present their cases before utility
commissions." In the late 1970s and early 1980s, however,
commentators began to argue that some provision for informal settlement
was needed to address the regulatory delay inherent in the formal
process.' 6 In the middle and late 1980s, the problem of regulatory delay
led state public utility commissions to experiment with informal
alternatives to traditional adjudicatory proceedings. 7 By 1990, a
commissioner in Colorado, a state that has experimented with ADR,
praised informal settlement, observing that it "can provide all the fairness
of legal due process and be a more effective means of building long-term
relationships which reflect the underlying reality of American public utility
regulation as a 'win-win' proposition." 8
In the context of public utility regulation, however, a unique and
disturbing practice has arisen: the nonunanimous or contested settlement.
ADR mechanisms have rarely departed from the traditional concept of the
litigation model in which all parties must either agree to the resolution of
the dispute or at least to the procedures that will lead to that resolution.' 9
While some states require unanimous consent before allowing settlements
of rate cases,20 many public utility commissions have abandoned the
traditional predicate for settlement, unanimity, and have approved rate

15. See infra notes 65-89.
16. See, e.g., Thomas D. Morgan, Toward a Revised Strategyfor Ratenaking, 1978
U. ILL. L.F. 21, 22, 76-78; see infra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., In re Public Serv. Co., 72 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 660 (Ind. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1986); In re Nine Mile Point Two Nuclear Generating Facility, 78 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 23 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986); In re Cleveland Elec. Illuminating
Co., 99 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 407 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n 1989).
18. Ronald L. Lehr, Regulatory Negotiations, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 13, 1990, at
20, 25.
19. See generally WALTER A. MAGGIOLO, TECHNIQUES OF MEDIATION 95-103 (1985);
PAUL PRASOW & EDWARD PETERS, ARBITRATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: CONFLICT

1-16 (1970).
20. Business & Professional People for Pub. Interest v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n,
555 N.E.2d 693, 704-5 (Iil. 1989); Kentucky Am. Water Co. v. Kentucky ex rel. Cowan,
847 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1993); Missouri ex rel. Monsanto Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 716
S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1986); Missouri ex rel. Fischer v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 645 S.W.2d
39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
RESOLUTION IN LABOR RELATIONS

The Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 12:257, 1995

case settlements to which several of the parties have not given their

assent. 2' As long as the utility and perhaps one or two other parties reach
an agreement with the commission staff,22 these commissions are willing
to approve the agreement and to forgo the requirement of a full
evidentiary hearing. They reason that such a procedure is necessitated by
the sheer number of parties involved in rate cases and the ability of a
single party to obstruct an otherwise reasonable settlement. Accordingly,

these commissions see the oxymoronic notion of a nonunanimous or
contested settlement as the only realistic means of implementing the
settlement process in these cases. z3
The danger of such an approach is obvious. Parties with a substantial
interest in a utility proceeding can be left out of the decision-making

process. Although commissions that permit nonunanimous settlements
require review of these settlements to determine their reasonableness, 24
these commissions often defer to the decision of the consenting parties.'
The utility can come to the bargaining table with a proposal, walk away
from negotiations whenever it finds the counterproposal of some other
party objectionable, continue discussions with the commission staff, and

then present to the commission an agreement with the staff as a settlement.
Furthermore, in their zeal to reap the benefits of the nonunanimous
settlement process, commissions shift the burden of proof to the

nonconsenting parties by forcing them to prove the unreasonableness of
21. See, e.g., In re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 81 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 587,
597-98 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1987); In re Public Serv. Co., 72 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 660 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986); In re Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 107 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 348, 352-53 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989); In re Nine Mile Point
Two Nuclear Generating Facility, 78 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 23 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1986); In re Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 99 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 407
(Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n 1989); In re El Paso Elec. Co., 101 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
405, 409-10 (Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1988).
22. The vast majority of states have three or four member commissions that are either
appointed by the governor, selected by the legislature, or elected by popular vote. CHARLES
F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILMES 119 (1985). Commissions hire
expert staff to advise them on technical ratemaking issues. See infra note 106.
23. See, e.g., In re Rules of Practice & Procedure Before the Comm'n, 112 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 215, 218 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1990).
24. See, e.g., In re Rules of Practice & Procedure Before the Comm'n, 112 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 215, 229 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1990); In re Cleveland Elec.
Illuminating Co., 99 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 407, 450 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n 1989);
In re El Paso Elec. Co., 101 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 405, 409 (Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1991).
25. See cases cited supra note 17.

Public Utility Rate Cases
the settlement. While both traditional regulatory hearings and the
unanimous settlement process provide protection for all parties, the
nonunanimous settlement process places some parties at a severe

disadvantage.
Data on reported commission cases show an increase over the past
decade in the use of the nonunanimous settlement mechanism to decide
rate cases. A vast majority of those cases terminated in settlements to
which consumer groups were nonconsenting parties.26 Of the twenty-four
reported general rate cases in which nonunanimous settlements have been
approved by commissions, only one was decided prior to 1980, four were
decided between 1980 and 1985, and the remainder were decided after
1985.27 A significant number of these settlements arose in the context
26. These data were obtained by reviewing nonunanimous settlement cases reported
in Public UtilitiesReports and on Lexis and Westlaw. The research was restricted to general
rate cases, those in which a commission considered the overall revenue requirement of the
utility and the allocation of that requirement among the different customer classes. Although
commissions have used the nonunanimous settlement mechanism in limited-issue rate cases,
such as those involving the rate impact of changes in tax laws, the research encompasses
only general rate cases because of their significant impact on ratepayers.
27. For an explanation of general rate cases, see supra note 26. The twenty-four cases
include the following commission proceedings: In re Arkansas La. Gas Co., 141 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 319 (Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1992), aff'd Bryant v. Arkansas Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 877 S.W.2d 594 (Ark. Ct. App. 1994); In re Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 99 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 141 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1988); In re Public Serv. Co., 72 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 660 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986); In re Louisville Gas & Elec.
Co., 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 348 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989), rev'd sub nom.
Kentucky ex rel. Cowan v. Kentucky Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 120 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
168 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1991), aff'd sub nom. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Kentucky ex rel.
Cowan, 862 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993); In re Washington Gas & Light Co., No.
8545, Order No. 70658 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1993); In re Detroit Edison Co., 39 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 107 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1980); In re UtiliCorp United, Inc.,
No. ER-93-37 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n June 18, 1993); In re Nine Mile Point Two Nuclear
Generating Facility, 78 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 23 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986);
In re Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 99 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 407 (Ohio Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1989); In re Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 86 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 463 (Or. Pub.
Util. Comm'n 1987); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 1992
WL 315144 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1992); In re Houston Lighting & Power Co., 134 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 303 (Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1991); In re El Paso Elec. Co., 101
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUJR) 405 (Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1988), aff'd, City of El Paso v.
Public Util. Comm'n, No. D-3053, 1994 WL 278111 (Tex. June 22, 1994); In re Virginia
Elec. & Power Co., 76 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 580 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986);
In re Hope Natural Gas Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431 (W. Va. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1983).
Information on the remaining cases was obtained from opinions involving judicial
review of commission approval of nonunanimous settlements. See United States v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 465 A.2d 829 (D.C. 1983); Business & Professional People for Pub. Interest
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proceedings addressing the rate treatment for expenses of recently
constructed or canceled plants, particularly nuclear generating facilities.2"
In seventeen of the twenty-four cases, no consumer group was a signatory
to the nonunanimous settlement; in three cases, one or more consumer
groups did not agree to the settlement; and in only four cases other
groups, such as industrial intervenors, were the sole nonconsenting
parties.29 To date, sixteen state commissions and the District of Columbia
v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 555 N.E.2d 693 (I11.1990); Kentucky Am. Water Co. v.
Kentucky ex rel. Cowan, 847 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1993); Missouri ex rel. Monsanto Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 716 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1986); Missouri ex rel. Fischer v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 645 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Attorney Gen. v. New Mexico Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 808 P.2d 606 (N.M. 1991); City of Somerville v. Public Util. Comm'n, 865
S'.W.2d 557 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); City of Abilene v. Public Util. Comm'n, 854 S.W.2d
932 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); In re New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 382 A.2d 826 (Vt. 1977).
28. See, e.g., Business & Professional People for Pub. Interest v. Illinois Commerce
Comm'n, 555 N.E.2d 693 (Ill. 1989); In re Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 99 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 141 (Cal. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1988); In re Public Serv. Co., 92 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 660 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986); In re Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 107 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 348 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989); In re Nine Mile Point Two
Nuclear Generating Facility, 78 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 23 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1986); In re Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 99 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 407 (Ohio Pub.
Util. Comm'n 1989); In re El Paso Elec. Co., 101 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 405 (Tex.
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1991); In re Houston Lighting & Power Co., 134 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 303 (Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1991).
29. In the following cases, no consumer group was a signatory party to the
nonunanimous settlement: Business & Professional People for Pub. Interest, 555 N.E.2d
693 (I11.1990); Kentucky Am. Water Co., 847 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1993); Attorney Gen. v.
New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 808 P.2d 606 (N.M. 1991); City of Somerville Public
Util. Comm'n, 865 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); City of Abilene Public Util.
Comm'n, 854 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); In re New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 382
A.2d 826 (Vt. 1977); In re Arkansas La. Gas Co., 141 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 319 (Ark.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1992); In re Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 99 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
141 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1992); In re Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 107 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 348 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989); In re Detroit Edison Co., 39 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 107 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1980); In re UtiliCorp United, Inc., No. ER-9337 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1993); In re Nine Mile Point Two Nuclear Generating Facility,
78 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 23 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986); In re Portland Gen.
Elec. Co., 86 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 463 (Or. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1987); In re Houston
Lighting & Power Co., 134 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 303 (Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1991);
In re El Paso Elec. Co., 101 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 405 (Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1991); In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 76 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 580 (W. Va. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1986); In re Hope Natural Gas Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431 (W.
Va. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983).
In the following cases, at least one consumer representative was a nonsignatory, but
other consumer groups did agree to the settlement: Missouri ex rel. Fischer v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 645 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); In re Public Serv. Co., 72 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 660 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986); In re Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co.,

Public Utility Rate Cases
Commission have recognized the validity of nonunanimous settlement of
rate cases.3" Six of those commissions have gone so far as to adopt

formal rules providing procedures for approval of such settlements. 3
In those states in which the nonunanimous settlement of rate cases
is allowed, use of the process is likely to continue. The recent

deregulation of the electric and telecommunications industries will
contribute to this trend. Commissions confronted with the very difficult
ratemaking issues raised by deregulation may seek alternatives to

traditional adjudication, as they did in handling the nuclear plant
controversies.
With deregulation, commissions are faced with the complex issue of
the allocation of costs between basic service customers, such as lowincome families, who do not have access to alternative sources of service
(captive customers), and customers who do have such access. This
problem is particularly severe for electric utilities with substantial sunk

99 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 407 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n 1989).
In the following cases, the sole nonconsenting parties were nonconsumer groups:
United States v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 465 A.2d 829 (D.C. 1983); Missouri ex reL
Monsanto Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 716 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1986); In re Washington
Gas Light Co., 84 MD PSC 274 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1993) (No. 8545, Order No.
70658); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 1992 WL 315144
(Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1990).
30. The states in which commissions have recognized the validity of nonunanimous
settlements are Arkansas, California, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan,
Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and West
Virginia. See supra note 27.
31. In re Commission's Rules of Practice & Procedure, 29 CPUC 2d 392 (Cal. Pub.
Util. Comm'n Sept. 28, 1988) (Nos. 88-09-060, 84-12-0281); Rules of Practice &
Procedure, Case No. 712, Order No. 10048, 1992 WL 548031 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1992); In re Rules of Practice & Procedure Before the Comm'n, 112 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 215 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1990); In re Rules of Practice & Procedure, No.
110, 1993 WL 562148 (N.M. Pub. Util. Comm'n Oct. 4, 1993); In re Procedures for
Settlement& Stipulation Agreements, Nos. 90-M-0255, 92-M-0138, 1992WL 487888 (N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 24, 1992); Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 240-2.115; see also 15 Tex.
Reg. 6101 (Oct. 19, 1990) (proposed amendment to TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, §§ 21.20121.208 setting forth nonunanimous settlement procedures which were never adopted).
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costs in generating plants. With the advent of retail wheeling,3 2 utilities
that wish to retain their large industrial customers will need to set prices
for these customers that are competitive with lower cost alternatives
provided by independent producers and other utilities.33 They will thus

attempt to shift as many costs as possible onto captive ratepayers in order
to remain competitive. Similarly, in the telecommunications area, local
companies may want to shift a large portion of shared costs onto captive

customers in order to remain in competition for the business of large
customers. Such cost-shifting may occur even though some of these costs
are attributable to non-basic services,34 from which the captive customers
derive no benefit. The intensification of competition in the utility industry
will make the allocation of costs between captive and noncaptive

ratepayers one of the main issues at stake in ratemaking proceedings."
The use of the nonunanimous settlement mechanism may have a
significant effect on how these costs are allocated. Commissions, wishing
to avoid contentious and lengthy hearings, may choose to defer to
settlements reached among the utility, the staff, and large customers.
However, if nonunanimous settlements which are opposed by
representatives of captive ratepayers are approved without full
adjudicatory hearings, the interests of many customers will be ignored.
This Article will examine the use of nonunanimous settlement

procedures by public utility commissions in light of the problems inherent
in such procedures, with particular regard to the plight of captive
ratepayers.36 First, the Article will present a brief history of the
32. Under retail wheeling a local utility is required to deliver the power of another
utility or independent producer for a fixed transmission charge. See Phillip S. Cross, Retail
Wheeling-Happy Motoringfor State Regulators?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 15, 1994, at 46.
33. See generally Suedeen G. Kelly, Overview, in XVI PUB. UTIL. ANTHOLOGY xvii,
xix-xx (Allison P. Zabriskie ed., July-Dec. 1993).
34. See generally Mark E. Meitzen, Shared Costs and the Cash Cow Debate: Who
Gets Milked, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 1, 1991, at 32, 33.
35. See Richard J. Rudden & Robert Hornick, Electric Utilities in the Future,
Competition is Certain, the Impact is Not, PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 1, 1994, at 21, 23.
36. Because of the different political contexts of federal and state ratemaking, this
Article confines its analysis to nonunanimous settlements of rate cases in state public utility
proceedings. The notion of nonunanimous settlements of rate cases originated in federal
regulation of wholesale rates. See Mobil Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 417 U.S. 283
(1974); Pennsylvania Gas & Water Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 463 F.2d 1242 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Lexington v. Federal Power Comm'n, 295 F.2d 109 (4th Cir. 1961). State
commissions and courts have relied on federal cases to support their approval of such
settlements. See infra notes 120, 162-186 and accompanying text. But see Business &
Professional People for Pub. Interest v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 555 N.E.2d 693 (Ill.
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development of rate regulation by state public utility commissions. It will
then describe the factors that led to the emergence of nonunanimous
settlements in utility rate proceedings and examine the statutory authority
for allowing such settlements. Next, it will analyze the benefits and
deficiencies of nonunanimous settlement as a dispute resolution
mechanism, with special attention to the problems of captive ratepayers.
Finally, the Article will recommend that the courts and commissions reject
the nonunanimous settlement process as a method for resolving rate cases.
I.

The Historical Development of Rate Base Regulation

The history of rate base regulation-the traditional method for setting
utility rates-is a saga of a search for workable procedures and standards
to balance the power between regulated industries and their consumers.
The early development of the independent regulatory commission
movement in America was tied to problems of railroad supervision and
control. The present public service and utility commissions are, for the
most part, the outgrowth of railroad commissions established to deal with
the problems of railroad power.37 Initially, railroads wielded tremendous
economic power over their customers. In response, customers sought
relief from state legislatures. When these forums proved to be inadequate
for continuous regulation of railroads, legislatures created independent
commissions to regulate the industry. However, when state legislatures
and commissions began to assert significant control over railroads, the

1990) (noting that the Mobil case "dealt with Federal law and a Federal agency; Federal
procedures are not necessarily consistent with Illinois law and procedures.") Id. at 704. In
the federal environment, because the consumers are usually large public utilities, the balance
of power among the parties is much more even than in the state context.
The Article also limits discussion to rate-related cases. ADR procedures have also
been encouraged in rulemaking and investigatory proceedings. See Evan van Hook, Note,
Conservation Through Cooperation: The Collaborative Planning Process for Utility
Conservation and Load Management, 102 YALE L.J. 1235 (1993). However, the impact of
the use of those procedures on the balance of power in the commission has not been
significant.
Finally, the Article does not address the issue of whether regulation, rather than the
market, is the best method for setting public utility rates. See generally Bernard S. Black
& Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Central Planningin Regulating
the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339 (1993). The Article assumes that
the regulatory system is the place in which rates are set and considers the proper use of ADR
within such a system.
37. HENRY C. SPURR, 1 GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC SERVICE REGULATION 9
(1924).
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railroads sought in the federal courts to regain their power. As a result
of these efforts, the Supreme Court ultimately balanced the competing
interests of the industry and consumers by allowing commissions
substantial authority to regulate railroads as long as they adhered to certain
formal standards which protected the rights of railroad stockholders. These
standards have been the essential basis for rate base regulation of public
utilities.
A.

The Growth of Independent Regulatory Commissions

Before the 1870s, railroads possessed substantial economic leverage
over their customers, causing customers to respond by seeking legislative
protection. The legislatures began to place sharp restrictions in railroad

charters they granted.3" As a result, numerous charters contained
provisions fixing maximum rates,39 and some even went so far as to
determine rates by a sliding scale that varied inversely with railroad

profits.' This form of regulation soon proved to be inadequate because
of its inflexibility. Economic conditions were constantly changing as
modern technology was being developed, necessitating a more dynamic
regulatory response. Charter provisions could not easily be changed to
meet new and unforeseen situations, making a dynamic regulatory process

38. As early as 1836, the Massachusetts legislature reserved to itself the authority to
modify railroad rates. PAUL RODGERS, THE NARUC WAS THERE: A HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS 3 (1979). The
legislature carved out the ratemaking power from the charters it granted to each railroad.
The Massachusetts Legislature, for example, enacted a special statute to incorporate the
Hartford & Springfield Rail-Road Corporation:
The Legislature may, after the expiration of five years from the time when the
said rail-road shall be opened for use, from time to time, alter or reduce the
rate of tolls or other profits upon said road; but the said tolls shall not, without
the consent of said corporation, be so reduced as to produce, with said profits,
less than ten percent per annum.
1839 Mass. Acts. ch. 101, § 5.
39. SPURR, supra note 37, at 2 (stating "maximum rate statutes were quite the rage
at one time"); see also Rates of Fare & Freight, 1874 Iowa Acts 61 (setting reasonable
maximum rates for the transportation of freight and passengers on the different railroads of
the state).
40. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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impossible.41
When it became clear that the job of railroad regulation could not
be handled effectively by the legislature, consumers demanded more
stringent and continuous control to offset the power of the companies. In
response, legislatures created independent commissions to regulate the
industry. Under pressure from the Granger movement, a number of states,
beginning with Illinois, enacted laws that fixed rates for transportation,
grain elevators, and warehouses.42 In 1869, the Illinois legislature passed
the first of the Granger Laws, which required rates to be just and
reasonable. However, this Act failed to provide an effective means for
enforcement of its provisions." Finally, in 1873, the Railroad and
41. See PHILLIPS, supra note 22, at 112. Maximum rate statutes were often passed
without adequate consideration of the problems involved and without knowledge of the
circumstances that the individual company faced. As a result, the statutes were often
arbitrary and unfair. See SPURR, supra note 37, at 2.
Attempts at municipal regulation also proved ineffective. Municipalities relied
primarily on franchise agreements as a means of exercising control over railroads. Before
a company could commence operation, it had to acquire a franchise from the city council.
The franchise usually set exact standards for service to be rendered and rates to be charged.
See generally HERMAN H. TRACHEL, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1950); DELOS F.
WILCOX, MUNICIPAL FRANCHISES (1910). However, a franchise had the status of a contract

which a state could not impair without the grantee's approval. See Trustees of Dartmouth
College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 518. Therefore, it was often impossible for franchises to be
changed regardless of how "ill-considered or antiquated with respect to current needs for
regulation they might be." BURTON N. BEHLING, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN PUBLIC
UTILITY INDUSTRIES 24 (1938). Predictably, the companies resisted downward rate changes,
and the municipalities resisted upward adjustments. As a result, especially where exclusive
franchises were issued, municipalities "found themselves in the disagreeable situation of
having bargained away their right to allow competition without having retained effective
control over rates and service." Id. at 25. Furthermore, the agreements often failed to
provide the administrative machinery needed to ensure that the company fulfilled the terms
of its contract. PHILLIPS, supra note 22, at 113. Thus, franchise regulation, like regulation
by charter provisions, did not provide a flexible remedy for the problems of excessive
railroad power.
42. Between 1871 and 1874, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin enacted Granger
legislation imposing stringent rate and service regulations on railroads, grain elevators, and
warehouses. Even though the Granger laws were eventually repealed in every state except
Illinois, they established a pattern that other states followed. RODGERS, supra note 38, at
4; see also Charles F. Adams, Jr., The Granger Movement, 120 N. AM. REv. 394 (1875);
Charles R. Dietrick, The Effects of the Granger Acts, 11 J. POL. ECON. 237 (1903); A.E.
Paine, The Granger Movement in Illinois, I U. ILL. STUD. 335 (1905).
43. Act of Mar. 10, 1869, §§ 1-7, 1869 IlI. Laws 309-12 (statute only provided for
criminal penalties against officers, agents, or employees of the company who wilfully or
knowingly violated the act); ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
COMMISSIONS 26 (1941). In 1871, Illinois created the Board of Railroad and Warehouse
Commissioners, which was charged with enforcing the laws regulating railroads and grain
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Warehouse Commission gained the power to issue a schedule of maximum
rates and, more importantly, to prosecute violations of the Act."
The companies fought back against this assertion of regulatory
power, but initially they were unsuccessful. In Munn v. Illinois,45 grain
elevator owners charged that the Illinois legislature's attempt to set
maximum rates was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Supreme Court rejected this challenge, observing:
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used
in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the

community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property
to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants
to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be
controlled by the public for the common good.'
In upholding the Act, the Court "laid the cornerstone of modem
regulation" and "placed a powerful weapon in the hands of the states." 47
Between 1870 and 1890, a large number of states followed Illinois' lead
and established railroad commissions with the power to fix rates and
enforce orders.4" These commissions had two types of powers. First,
elevators. Board of Railroad &Warehouse Commissioners Act of Apr. 13, 1871, §§ 1-19,
1871 Ill. Laws 618-24. This statute, however, provided no procedure to enforce the
Commissioners' powers. See generally ALEXANDER DAVIDSON & STUVE BERNARD,
COMPLETE HISTORY OF ILLINOIS FROM 1873 TO 1884 (1884) (discussing Granger railroad
legislation and the political aspects of the Granger movement in Illinois).
44. Act of May 2, 1873, 1873 Ill. Laws 136-60.
45. 94 U.S. 113 (1876). In 1874, fourteen grain storage plants operated in Chicago.
The plants were owned by approximately thirty people and were controlled by nine
companies. The leaders of the nine firms periodically met in order to agree on grain storage
rates. The defendants were convicted and fined for charging rates in excess of those fixed
pursuant to the Act. The court concluded that the owners had a "virtual monopoly." Id.
at 131.
For a description of the arguments against the Granger laws, see generally FRANK
HENDRICK, RAILWAY CONTROL BY COMMISSIONS 161 (1900) (condemning Granger laws);
W.M. Grosvenor, The Communist and the Railway, 4 INT'L REV. 585 (1877) (arguing that
Granger legislation was communistic).
46. 94 U.S. at 126.
47. RODGERS, supra note 38, at 4; see also Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation with
PublicInterest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089 (1930); Breck P. McAllister, Lord Hale and the Business
Affected with a Public Interest, 43 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1930).
48. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 192, 1889 Kan. Sess. Laws 284-86 (giving
conditional powers to the Board of Railroad Commissioners); Railroads and Other Common
Carriers, ch. 124, 1883 Kan. Sess. Laws 186-96; Act of Mar. 7, 1887, ch. 10, 1887 Minn.
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they had the authority to oversee railroads. This power allowed the
commissions to ensure that the railroads complied with the law by

inspecting railroads for safety, investigating accidents, examining company
accounts, and compelling disputants and witnesses to testify under oath.
More importantly, these commissions could set reasonable and
nondiscriminatory railroad rates. By law, a rate established by the

commission was prima facie reasonable in any suit between a railroad and
any shipper.49 Moreover, the attorney general and, in certain
circumstances, the commission could bring suit to enforce the rates
established by the commission."
B.

Judicial Restraints on Regulation by Independent Commission

In the political battle between railroads and consumers, the Munn
decision gave state legislatures substantial power to regulate railroads and
other companies "affected with the public interest."'" The railroads,
Carriers, ch. 124, 1883 Kan. Sess. Laws 186-96; Act of Mar. 7, 1887, ch. 10, 1887 Minn.
Laws 49-66 (regulating common carriers and creating the Railroad and Warehouse
Commission); Act of Mar. 11, 1884, ch. XXIII, 1884 Miss. Laws 31-44 (regulating railroad
rates and creating a railroad commission); Act of Mar. 29, 1875, 1875 Mo. Laws 112-19
(regulating charges of railroad companies and providing for railroad commissioners); Act
of Sept. 14, 1883, ch. 101, 1883 N.H. Laws 78-81 (establishing a Board of Railroad
Commissioners). The financial panic of 1873 placed many railroads in financial difficulty.
Because the panic occurred at the same time that the strong commissions were being
established, public opinion turned against the commissions. As a result, many of the newlyformed commissions were abolished or converted to playing an advisory role. However, this
trend was short lived. By 1887, ten states had established strong commissions with rate
making and enforcement power. These states were: Alabama, California, Georgia, Illinois,
Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, and South Carolina. See
CUSHMAN, supra note 43, at 27; MARTIN G. GLAESER, PUBLIC UTILITIES IN AMERICAN

CAPITALISM 64 (1957).
49. See, e.g., Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Jones, 37 N.E. 247, 249 (Ill.
1894); St. Paul
Ass'n of Commerce v. Chicago B & Q. R.R., 158 N.W. 982, 984 (Minn. 1916). See
generally CUSHMAN, supra note 43, at 27.
50. CUSHMAN, supra note 43, at 27. While the strong commissions had the power to
set rates and issue orders, they were dependent on the courts for the enforcement of those
orders. Id. at 32.
51. Neil N. Bernstein, Utility Rate Regulation: The Little Locomotive That Couldn't,
1970 WASH. U. L.Q. 223, 231-32.
The state had only to determine that the circumstances with respect to a
particular business warranted the imposition of some form of price control and
'if a state of facts could exist that would justify such legislation,' the courts
would assume that it did exist. Under those circumstances, Munn seemed to
say, the property owner was at the mercy of the legislature. This was consistent
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however, maintained their attacks in the courts on legislative regulation.
In Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota,52 one
railroad challenged a Minnesota statute establishing a railway commission
with the power to determine "equal and reasonable rates." Under the
statute, if a railroad refused to obey a rate reduction order, the
Commission had the authority to seek a writ of mandamus from the state
court. When the Commission sought the writ against a railroad, the
company attempted to defend itself by showing that the reduced rates were
not equal and reasonable. The state court, however, held that the
Commission's decision was unreviewable because the statute had made
53
the Commission's decision "final and conclusive."
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute was
unconstitutional:
In the present case, the railroad alleged that the rate of charge
fixed by the commission was not equal or reasonable, and [the
Minnesota] Supreme Court held that the statute deprived the
company of the right to show that judicially. The question of
the reasonableness of a rate of charge for transportation by a
railroad company, involving as it does the element of
reasonableness both as regards the company and as regards the
public, is eminently a question for judicial investigation,
requiring due process of law for its determination. If the
company is deprived of the power of charging reasonable rates
for the use of its property, and such deprivation takes place in
the absence of an investigation by judicial machinery, it is
deprived of the lawful use of its property, and thus in substance
and effect, of the property itself, without due process of law
54

relations, there was no limitation on the police power of the states.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
52. 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
53. Id. at 457.
54. Id. at 457-58. Three justices dissented, observing: "[The decision] practically
overrules Munn v. Illinois ...and the several railroad cases that were decided at the same
time. The governing principle of those cases was that regulation and settlement of fares of
railroads and other public accommodations is a legislative prerogative and not a judicial
one." Id. at 461 (dissenting opinion).
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While in Munn, consumers had won a major victory which gave state
legislatures the power to regulate public utilities, the Chicago, Milwaukee
decision limited that power by affording companies the right to a full
judicial hearing before they were required to comply with a rate order.

The power of state legislatures was further limited by the Supreme
Court's 1898 decision in Smyth v. Ames," in which it set constitutional
standards for the reasonableness of rates. In that case, railroad
stockholders challenged a legislative reduction in rates as confiscatory,

resulting in an actual taking of their property without fair compensation
in violation of constitutional due process.56 The Court held:
[T]he basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of rates
to be charged by a corporation maintaining a highway under
legislative sanction must be the fair value of the property being

used by it for the convenience of the public. And, in order to
ascertain that value, the original cost of construction, the
amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount and
market value of its bonds, the present as compared with the
original cost of construction, the probable earning capacity of
the property under particular rates prescribed by statute, and
the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters for
consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be just
and right in each case . . .What the company is entitled to ask
is a fair return upon the value of that which it employs for the
public convenience."
railroads and other public accommodations is a legislative prerogative and not a judicial
one." Id. at 461 (dissenting opinion).
55. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
56. The doctrine that state rate fixing must not be confiscatory was originally
pronounced in Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886) (holding
that "[u]nder pretense of regulating fares and freights, the State cannot require a railroad
corporation to carry persons or property without reward; neither can it do that which in law
amounts to a taking of private property for public use without just compensation, or without
due process of law.").
57. 169 U.S. at 546-47. The idea that a common carrier is entitled to a reasonable rate
for his services has its roots in the English common law. See Bastard v. Bastard, 2 Shower
82 (K.B. 1679). By the same token, common law courts declared that common carrier rates
must be reasonable. In his treatise De Portibus Maris, 1 Harg. Law Tracts 78 (1670), Sir
Matthew Hale, Chief Justice to King James I of England, wrote that when private property
is affected with the public interest, the rates for public use must be reasonable and moderate.
Lord Hale's reasoning was relied upon by the Court in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126
(1876). The common law notion of reasonable rates can be traced back to the Church
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This decision set the constitutional standard that a utility is entitled to a
fair rate of return on its property. At the same time, the case created
standards to counterbalance consumers' disproportionate political clout
with state legislatures. The Court assumed that legislatures and their
designees were subject to political pressure from the public and would
safeguard the rights of consumers.5" The Court hoped "to protect the
utility owner whose voice was not heeded by the legislature and to ensure
that the rates were not too low from his standpoint."'5 9
With Smyth, a balance was struck between the power of the railroads
and the power of their customers. While initially the railroads dominated
their customers, consumers fought back and achieved direct statutory
regulation and then the creation of commissions with authority to establish
rates and to enforce them. Facing these consumer victories, railroad
stockholders feared that unlimited control by legislatures could make their
investments worthless.' Motivated by this fear, they counterattacked in
the courts. Although the courts recognized the authority of state
legislatures to regulate railroads and other public utilities, they also
recognized the right of the railroads to a fair return.
The Smyth and Chicago, Milwaukee decisions set the standards from
which the modern system of rate regulation developed. The Chicago,
Milwaukee decision required that a utility be accorded a full hearing
before it could be compelled to comply with a state rate order. Under
Smyth, no state could confidently issue a rate order unless it could prove
to a court that the rates provided the utility with a fair return on fair
value. In order to arrive at a fair profit to be covered by rates for the use
of the plant, the state needed to determine the value of the physical plant
used by the utility.61 The new mandate necessitated regulation by
commission rather than by direct legislative action.62 Commissions could
implement the due process hearings mandated by Chicago, Milwaukee,
and at the same time could provide an efficient forum for the valuation
Fathers' doctrine of just price. GLAESER, supra note 48, at 196-197.
58. FRANCIS X. WELCH, CASES AND TEXTS ON PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 236
(rev. ed. 1968).

59. Id.
60. See generally Bernstein, supra note 51, at 241-42.
61. Id. at 243.
62. Id. at 577. States began to establish independent regulatory commissions that had

the authority to value property as the basis for setting reasonable rates. By 1915, every state
except Delaware had established some kind of board to regulate utilities. Id. at 296; SPURR,

supra note 37, at 12.
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of property required by Smyth.63 The requirements of full hearings and
the adherence to particular constitutional standards for ratemaking assured

investors that they would receive a fair profit on their investments.'
Thus, the modem system of regulation was developed to protect the rights
of both consumers and investors.
C.

The Modem Process of Rate Base Regulation
In response to the Chicago, Milwaukee and Smyth cases, legislatures

inserted provisions into utility commission enabling statutes that provided
for hearings in rate cases and established particular standards for
ratemaking. 6" The current process for regulation of rates is essentially

the same as that contained in the early statutes.
Consistent with Chicago, Milwaukee, statutes provide for full
adjudicatory hearings on utility proposals to change rates.' Utilities must
file proposed rate schedules with the commission and must publish notice
of the proposed changes.67 The commission then has a period of time,
usually thirty to forty-five days, to decide whether or not to suspend the
rates and to hold hearings on the proposed schedules." If the commission
does not suspend the new schedules, the utility puts them into effect after

63. Bernstein, supra note 51, at 242.
64. Id. at 241-42. A contemporary editorial on the Smyth decision observed: "Many
observations might be made on this decision, but practically the most important point about
it is that it makes the law perfectly plain, and makes railway property much more secure
from attacks through State legislation than it has hitherto been." A.G. Sedgwick, Nebraska
Freight-Rate Decision, 66 NATION 260, 261 (1898).
65. See, e.g., N.Y. Public Service Law § 1 (McKinney 1916).
66. Although the act of prescribing rates for the future is considered a legislative
function, the determination of whether a rate is reasonable is considered a judicial function.
See ICC v. Cincinnati, N.O.T.P. Ry., 167 U.S. 479, 499 (1897).
67. See, e.g., An Act to provide for the regulation of public utilities, 1913 Ill. Laws
459, § 35; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 220, § 5/9-201(a) (Smith-Hurd 1993); TEx. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 1446(c), § 43(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993). Rate cases can also be initiated by
the commission itself or on the complaint by a ratepayer. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
220, § 5/9-250 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
68. See, e.g., 1913 Ill. Laws 459, § 36. See generally NATIONAL ASS'N OF
REGULATORY COMM'RS, 1989 ANNUAL REP. ON UTIL. AND CARRIER REG. 849-52 (1990)

(Table 209) [hereinafter NARUC REP.].
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the waiting period.6 9 If the commission does suspend the proposed rates,
it holds hearings on the reasonableness of the schedules before the
commissioners themselves, hearing examiners, or administrative law
judges designated by the commission.70
At those hearings, the utility and "such persons or corporations as
the commission shall allow to intervene" have a right to appear in person
or through an attorney, to introduce evidence, and to cross examine
witnesses. Commissions have the power to hire expert staff, including
attorneys, engineers, and accountants, who can testify at the
proceedings.72 In addition, commissions have the authority to issue
subpoenas compelling the testimony of witnesses or the production of
books and accounts." 3 Although commissions are not bound by technical
rules of evidence or similar formalities when taking testimony,74 a full
record of the hearing is required. 75 At the conclusion of such a hearing,
the commission must make findings of fact and enter an order based on
the record.76
In addition to hearing procedures, and in accordance with Smyth v.
Ames, the enabling statutes have also set standards for the ratemaking
process. They require that commissions set rates that are "just and
reasonable., 77 Consistent with Smyth, this phrase has been read to
require that commissions allow the utility an opportunity to earn a
reasonable return on its invested capital and to pay its reasonable
operating expenses .7' This requirement is reflected in the classic
ratemaking formula: R = O + B(r), where R is the revenue required by the
69. See, e.g., 1913 II. Laws 459, § 35.
70. See, e.g., id. § 60. See generally NARUC REP., supra note 68, at 910-13 (Table
228).
71. See, e.g., 1913 Ill. Laws 459, § 65. See generally NARUC REP., supra note 68,
at 269-302.
72. See, e.g., 1913 Ill. Laws 459, § 3.
73. See, e.g., id. § 65.
74. See, e.g., id. § 60. See generally NARUC REP., supra note 68, at 269-302.
75. See, e.g., 1913 III. Laws 459, § 65.
76. See, e.g., id. § 65.
77. See, e.g., id. § 36 ("On such [rate] hearing the commission shall establish the rates
or other charges . . .which it shall find to be just and reasonable.").
78. PHILLIPS, supra note 22, at 157-60; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 1446(c),

§ 39(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993) ("In fixing rates of a public utility, [the commission] shall fix
its overall revenues at a level which will permit such utility a reasonable opportunity to earn
a reasonable return on its invested capital used and useful in rendering service to the public
over and above its reasonable operating expenses.").
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company, 0 is the utility's operating expenses, B is the firm's rate base
(invested capital), and r is the reasonable return allowed the company on
its rate base.79 The commission bases the precise amount for each of
these elements on evidence obtained from the utility's books and records
and from expert testimony.8 0 Over the years, many different statutory
and regulatory standards have been developed to guide commissions in
determining, as precisely as possible, each of the terms in the ratemaking
formula."'
In Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. ,2 the
Supreme Court rejected, as a constitutional matter, rigid adherence to the
Smyth v. Ames fair value standard for ratemaking. Generally, however,
states have not abandoned the rate base method for formulating rates. In
Hope, the Court concluded that a commission is not required to use any
particular method in determining rates as long as the end result is fair.
Nevertheless, in interpreting commission enabling statutes, state courts
have generally required commissions to follow the basic formula for rate
fixing outlined in Smyth v. Ames. 3 Despite the end-result language of
Hope, state courts have held that the commission must render findings of
fact on each of the variables in the formula, and that any material error
as to a particular variable renders the end result invalid.8 4 As one court

79. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., & ERNEST GELLHORN, REGULATED INDUSTRIES 89
(1987); see Citizens Util. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 529 N.E.2d 510, 512-13 (II1.
1988).
80. Even the earliest enabling statutes for utility commissions empowered them to
establish a uniform system of accounts to be kept by utilities. See, e.g., 1913 II1. Laws 459,

§ 11.
81. See generally Stefan H. Krieger, The Ghost of Regulation Past: Current
Applications of the Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking in Public Utility Proceedings, 1991
U. ILL. L. REV. 983, 995-96.

82. 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944).
WELCH, supra note 58, at 284.
84. See, e.g., Keystone Water Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 385 A.2d 946,
953-55 (Pa. 1978) (per curiam) (opinion in support of affirmance for a divided court rejects
Commission's argument that it could give no consideration to a plant as an element of rate
base as long as the end result was just and reasonable); Commonwealth Tel. Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 32 N.W.2d 247 (Wis. 1948) (rejecting Commission's order that failed to
determine rate base or rate of return). See generally Francis X. Welch, The Rate Base Is
Here to Stay, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 22, 1953, at 635, 641 (observing that despite the "end
83.

result" language in Hope, "the ghost of Smyth v. Ames is still doing business at the same
old stand").
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has observed: "If the Commission makes a material error, in considering

the elements which make up the rate base, the rate of return, the operating
expenses or the operating income, the error will necessarily be reflected
5
8

in its conclusion."
Finally, the enabling acts provide standards for the distribution of
rates among different customer classes and within particular classes.
Generally, statutes proscribe "undue discrimination" in rates.8 6 Beyond

that proscription, commissions have broad discretion in designing rates.8 7
However, most commissions focus on the cost of providing service to
different customers as the basis for allocation of rates. 8 As with the

revenue requirement, commissions have developed different methodologies
to determine the "cost of service," 9 and expert evidence on this issue
is presented at the rate hearings.
Although the rate regulation process initially began as a legislative
attempt to rein in the power of utilities, over time the process has taken
on many of the accoutrements of a judicial proceeding. Formal hearings

are held, the utility has the burden of proof to show that its proposed rates
are just and reasonable, expert witnesses are presented for cross

examination, exhibits are introduced, and a record is preserved. As at a
trial, the commission uses certain legal standards to assess the evidence

used in determining each of the variables in the revenue requirement
formula and to decide upon the proper rate design. The commission is
then required to issue detailed findings of fact. If any material finding is
old stand").
85. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 386 P.2d 515, 525 (Kan.
1963).
86. See, e.g., 1913 11. Laws 459, § 38 ("No public utility shall, as to rates or other
charges, services, facilities or in any other respect, make or grant any preference or
advantage to any corporation or person or subject any corporation or person to any prejudice
or disadvantage. No public utility shall establish or maintain any unreasonable difference
as to rates or other charges, services, facilities, or in any other respect, either as between
localities or as between classes of service.").
87. See, e.g., Wood v. Public Util. Comm'n, 481 P.2d 823, 827 (Cal. 1971); Texas
Alarm & Signal Ass'n v. Public Util. Comm'n, 603 S.W.2d 766, 772 (Tex. 1980); City
of West Allis v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 167 N.W.2d 401, 405 (Wis. 1969). Commissions
may base the allocation of rates on any of the following factors: the cost of providing service
to the different customers, the purpose for which the service is used, the quantity or amount
of service received, the different character of service furnished, the time or season of use,
the constancy or regularity of use, or "any other matter which presents a substantial
difference as a ground of distinction." Texas Alarm & Signal Ass'n, 603 S.W.2d at 772.
88. See PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 79, at 181-82.
89. Id. at 182-93.
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erroneous, the order is invalid. This approach is an outgrowth of the
political balance reached between the railroads and their customers during
the late nineteenth century. The power to prescribe rates is considered a
legislative function, but the determination of the reasonableness of those
rates is regarded as a judicial function.
II.

The Development of Nonunanimous Settlements of Rate Cases

The energy crisis of the 1970s contributed to the rapid increase in
the number of rate cases brought before commissions. Burdened by a
backlog of litigation, commissions developed new methods of resolving
rate cases, including the use of nonunanimous settlements. Commissions
have adopted two approaches to nonunanimous settlements. Some have
used these settlements merely as evidence to be considered in the context
of full evidentiary hearings. Other commissions have approved
nonunanimous settlements without such hearings, thereby potentially
ignoring the interests of groups which were not parties to the settlement
agreement.
A.

Changes in the Regulatory Environment

Until the late 1960s, the adjudicatory model for ratemaking was
generally considered to be quite effective. Prior to that time, public utility
regulation was a fairly placid affair, with little attention given to
modifying the procedures of traditional rate base regulation. For example,
during the first part of the twentieth century, the electric utility business
required only minimal regulatory intervention.9 Throughout this period,
thermal efficiency gradually grew and the scale of power plants soared,
resulting in a trend toward lower operating expenses and declining
marginal costs. 9 In this environment, electric utilities filed rate cases
infrequently because they generally felt they were receiving a satisfactory
rate of return without formal regulatory proceedings.' Meanwhile,
consumer groups were content because nominal prices were either constant

90. See RICHARD F. HIRSH, TECHNOLOGY AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE AMERICAN
ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 176 (1989).
91. Id.at 176.
92. Paul L. Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the
Process of Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J.L. & ECON. 291 (1974).
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or falling. 93 And with no complaints from consumer groups or requests
for relief from utilities, utility commissions remained passive. 94 As
Richard Hirsch describes:
During much of the century... the stakeholders in the electric.
power matrix had formed an implicit consensus about the
technological system and its management. Benefits accrued to
all: consumers enjoyed electricity whose unit price declined
gradually. Investors profited from steadily increasing dividends
and share prices of utility stocks. Managers congratulated
themselves for their aptitude in running a complex technological
enterprise and for improving the financial picture of their
companies. Manufacturers happily took new orders for the
advanced technology that they pioneered. And regulators sat
quietly on the sidelines providing little interference in what
appeared to be one of the best examples of a natural
monopoly .9
Then, in the late 1960s, a rise in energy prices caused the situation
to change dramatically. The technological advances that had resulted in
lower prices were no longer occurring at such a rapid rate.9 6
Concurrently, inflation skyrocketed, and interest rates climbed steeply.97
Then, in October of 1973, the country was hit by the Arab oil embargo,
and the energy crisis began. In reaction to these events, electric utilities
embarked on nuclear construction programs, and gas utilities sought
alternative sources of fuel."
With rising fuel costs and massive construction projects, utilities no
longer felt that they were receiving an adequate price for their services.
Consequently, they brought many more formal rate cases before public

93. Id. at 299.
94. See id. at 298-99.
95. HIRSH, supra note 90, at 176-77.
96. Stefan H. Krieger, An Advocacy Model for Representation of Low-Income
Intervenors in State Public Utility Proceedings, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 639 (1990).
97. Id. at 639-40.
98. Id. at 640; see also James E. Hickey, Jr., Mississippi Power & Light Company:
A DeparturePointfor Extension of the "BrightLine" Between Federal and State Regulatory
Jurisdiction over Public Utilities, 10 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 57, 63-64 (observing that the
energy crisis reaffirmed "the reasonableness of planning decisions to build nuclear power
plants").
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and by 1975, it had climbed to 114. 9 Rate cases became frequent
occurrences for many utilities. Commissions discovered that utilities never
seemed to be able to achieve the allowed rate of return set in a case, and,
after the termination of one case, immediately filed new cases for further
relief. ° In addition, ancillary proceedings began to arise, addressing
adjustments for fuel costs and other rate-related issues.' 0 ' As a result
of the rapid growth in rate proceedings, electric rates rose ninety percent
nationally in the five years after 1970. 02
As the number of rate cases grew and rates began to soar, consumer
organizations became active in these proceedings. Some groups grew out
of neighborhood and civic organizations whose members felt the crunch
of higher utility rates and sought to put political pressure on commissions.
Other groups addressed particular issues that they felt were important to
the public interest, such as environmental concerns. Industrial and
commercial consumer groups intervened to protect the pocketbooks of
large and medium energy users. Finally, in reaction to political pressure
from ratepayers, state legislatures began to develop offices of public
counsel, and other proxy advocates, such as offices of attorneys general,
sought to represent the interests of consumers in rate proceedings. 03
Faced with increased rate filings and active consumer intervention,
commissions felt overburdened."°4 Rate cases became lengthy

99. Krieger, supra note 96, at 640.
100. Joskow, supra note 92, at 313.
101. Krieger, supra note 81, at 986-87.
102. Krieger, supra note 96, at 640.
103. Id. at 643-44.
104. Joskow, supra note 92, at 313. "As a result of the changing economic and social
environment in which they were operating, the 'satisfactory' balancing of different
interestgroups that had characterized the procedural equilibrium of the 1950s and 1960s was
now being quickly destroyed." Id. James Richardson quotes from a technical report to the
Edison Electric Institute:
Increases in energy prices, as well as public awareness and political organizing
around consumer and environmental issues, have sharpened the conflict among
utilities, consumer and environmental interest groups, and state utility
regulatory authorities. Complex technical and financial issues are hotly debated
in administrative hearings. With increasing frequency, parties dissatisfied with
the results of hearings appeal decisions to state courts on procedural grounds.
This further distracts from efforts to deal with the substantive issues at hand,
and increases the costs and delays associated with operating the utility.
James R. Richardson, Overcoming Obstacles to Negotiating Electric Utility Industry
Regulations, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 41, 41 (1991).
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proceedings, delayed in part by the sheer number of cases filed with
commissions, the complexity of the issues involved, and the participation

of intervenor groups.

5

Commission staffs,"1°

strapped by limited

resources, confronted the daunting tasks of evaluating and presenting
testimony on the ever-expanding number of cases." Rate orders in
major cases began to run into the hundreds of pages, with thousands of
additional pages of records of the testimony, exhibits, and briefs. 0 "
And, with extremely large rate hikes at stake, appeals of rate orders,

especially by consumer groups, became a frequent occurrence."
While most consumer intervenor groups were not particularly
successful in these cases at first, they eventually had a significant impact.
One early study found that in New York Public Service Commission gas
and electric rate cases, "the presence of an intervenor will vary from no
effect to a reduction of 0.40 percentage points in the allowed rate of

return, depending on the degree of conflict between the [utility] and the
intervenor..,"l 0 While it is unclear whether the reductions were the result
of effective advocacy by the intervenors or merely the consequence of
political concessions by the Commission,' indisputably the presence
of an intervenor had some effect in at least some cases. And even if
consumer groups did not affect the ultimate decision in the case, their
participation and demands for compliance with procedural requirements
James R. Richardson, Overcoming Obstacles to Negotiating Electric Utility Industry
Regulations, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 41, 41 (1991).
105. Morgan, supra note 16, at 24-25. This problem was not just an issue for energy
regulation. In telecommunications, there has been significant uncertainty on all sides as a
result of the deregulation of the telephone industry. Jonathan Brock, Using Negotiation and
Mediation as an Adjunct to Utility Regulation and Rate Setting, in MEDIATION INST.,
DEVELOPING SYSTEMS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF RECURRING DISPUTES: FOUR CASE
STUDIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1, 2 (1984).
106. Staff members of most commissions are appointed by and report to the
commission or its executive director to advise the commission on technical engineering,
accounting, economics, and legal issues. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 220, §§ 5/11-201
to 5/11-208 (West 1993). In some states staff members have civil service or merit
protections, while in others there is no such job security. See generally NARUC REP., supra
note 68, at 307-12, 864-83 (Table 215).
107. See generallyJonathan D. Raab, Consensus-Building in Electric Utility Regulation
89 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
108. Richardson, supra note 104, at 42-43.
109. Krieger, supra note 81, at 988.
110. Paul L. Joskow, The Determination of the Allowed Rate of Return in a Formal
Regulatory Hearing, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 632, 641 (1972).
111. Morgan, supra note 16, at 50.
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delayed the proceedings as long as possible, postponing the ultimate
imposition of higher rates. "2 As time went on, a number of these groups
refined their strategies, retained highly effective expert witnesses, and
became quite successful at reducing the magnitudes of rate increases
allowed by commissions. 3
B.

Nonunanimous Settlement as an Alternative to Traditional Rate of
Return Regulation

Faced with active consumer participation in rate cases, commissions
and utilities began to question the effectiveness of traditional rate base
regulation. 1 4 Commissioners and some commentators began to describe
the process as too "rigid" and "adversarial..""5 Furthermore, although
adjudicatory processes were originally established to address the
requirements of Chicago, Milwaukee and Smyth, some commissions now
challenged reliance on a judicial model for setting rates." 6 Proposals
112. See id. at 25.
113. See, e.g., infra notes 243-248 and accompanying text.
114. Raab, supra note 107, at 95-96 (author interviewed commission representatives
in seven states, all of whom indicated a rise in settlements over the past five to ten years).
In the third edition of Public Utilities Reports Digest, the first reference to reported
settlements of cases occurs in the early 1960s in hotel, water, and telephone rates. Starting
in the early 1980s, the number of reported cases raising settlement issues increased
significantly. See 5 PUB. UTIL. REP. DIG. 3D Procedure § 31 (1983).
At the federal level, the Federal Power Commission (FPC), the precursor to the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), originally adopted settlement procedures
in 1949. Raab, supra note 107, at 95. It was not until the early 1960s, however, that the
FPC began to actively foster settlements as a way of resolving cases. At that time, the
Commission was faced with numerous requests for rate increases by gas pipeline companies.
Because of the backlog in proceedings, the companies had collected over $1 billion subject
to refund. Id.
115. See, e.g., Brock, supra note 105, at 20; The Forum-Question 2: Dispute
Resolution, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 8, 1990, at 28, 30-31 [hereinafter Question 2: Dispute
Resolution].
116. See, e.g., In re Commission's Rules of Practice & Procedure, 28 CPUC 2d 77
(Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Apr. 27, 1988) (Nos. 88-04-059; 84-12-028). Adopting a
settlement rule, the Commission rejected a consumer intervenor's proposal that a rate case
be fully litigated if the settlement is contested. The Commission noted:
Once a stipulation or settlement is proposed, we wish to move quickly to
examine it, receive parties' comments, hear parties' cases, and decide the
matter, providing earlier certainty of outcome than would be possible under a
year-long rate case schedule and freeing up parties' resources so that they might
be used productively in other proceedings.
Id.
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to develop methods for settlement of rate cases were made to expedite the
process and ease the conflicts among parties."7 Eventually some
commissions even adopted formal rules for settling cases."'
In establishing these procedures, most commissions concluded that
a requirement of unanimous agreement would undermine the settlement
process. They assumed that the utility must consent to the settlement,"19
but recognized no requirement for agreement by all the intervenors. In
supporting this position, a number of commissions pointed to language
in federal cases construing the settlement provisions of the federal
Administrative Procedure Act (APA):
There is nothing in the Administrative Procedure Act which
expressly requires unanimous consent of all the participating
parties to an agreement of settlement; and to read such a
contention into the statute in view of the countless state
agencies, municipalities, and consumers who may be interested
in an administrative proceeding would effectively destroy the
settlement provision. 120
While a unanimity rule would obviously make the achievement of
settlements more difficult, these commissions fail to explain in any detail
why such a requirement for state ratemaking cases would "effectively
destroy" the settlement process. A few merely suggest that a requirement
of unanimous consent would allow inactive or uncooperative parties to
2
block any possible settlement.1 '
117. See, e.g., In re Public Serv. Co., 72 Pub, Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 660 (Ind. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1986).
118. See supra note 31.
119. Although no decision ever directly addresses this issue, commissions and courts
apparently assume that because of the constitutional protections accorded utility investors
in rate proceedings, a nonunanimous settlement cannot be approved without the utility's
consent. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
120. City of Lexington v. Federal Power Comm'n, 295 F.2d 109, 121 (4th Cir. 1961);
see In re Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 130, 146 (Iowa
Commerce Comm'n 1982) (citing Lexington); see also In re Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 99
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 141, 176 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1988) (citing Pennsylvania
Gas & Water Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 463 F.2d 1242, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). The
federal Administrative Procedure Act provides that all interested parties shall be given the
opportunity for submission of "offers of settlement." 5 U.S.C. § 554(c)(1) (1988).
121. See In re Rules of Practice & Procedure Before the Comm'n, 112 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 215, 218 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1990); see also In re Cleveland Elec.
Illuminating Co., 99 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 407, 418 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n 1989)
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Implicit in these decisions is the belief that some intervenors,
especially public interest and consumer groups, have an interest in
obstructing settlements. Such groups, some commentators argue, have a
strong ideological commitment to their causes and thus are less likely to
compromise. 2 Additionally, some have asserted that these organizations
seek media attention to gain political support for their causes and
accordingly favor the public forum of litigation over the more private
negotiation arena.' 23 Finally, it is argued that "[b]ecause such groups
sell advocacy rather than marketplace products, they often tend to be
dominated by lawyers, with a preference for victory through
litigation." 4 Faced with these notions about consumer groups,
commissions assume that the settlement process will usually be successful
only if unanimity is not required.
C.

Approaches to the Nonunanimous Settlement Process

Commissions have adopted two general approaches to nonunanimous
settlement procedures. A few regard settlement agreements merely as
additional evidence to be considered in reaching a traditional rate base
decision.' 25 Under this approach, the utility presents its case-in-chief,
and the settlement is introduced into evidence. Then, other parties and
staff respond. The commission renders findings of fact on the entire
record, including the settlement agreement, based on the traditional rate
base formula. Because this approach maintains the requirement of a full
evidentiary hearing, it deviates little from traditional ratemaking methods.
Most commissions, however, consider the merits of settlement
agreements without holding a full adjudicatory proceeding. 2 6 These
(criticizing intervenors for failing to present testimony on revenue requirement when staff,
industrial intervenors, city, and proxy consumer advocate were signatories to agreement).
122. See Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations
in Administrative Regulation, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 655, 674.
123. Id.
124. Id. Indeed, in the LG&E case, the Commission specifically criticized the
intervenors for their demands in negotiations for attorneys' fees. In re Louisville Gas &
Elec. Co., 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 348, 354 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989).
125. In re Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 85 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 605, 614
(Ind. Util. Reg. Comm'n 1987) ("[Ilt
is our duty to make an independent decision of all
relevant matters giving consideration to all evidence of record including the Stipulation
between the parties.").
126. See, e.g., In re Commission's Rules of Practice & Procedure, 29 CPUC 2d 392
(Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Sept. 28, 1988); In re Rules of Practice & Procedure Before the
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commissions will approve a settlement even without the development of
a complete evidentiary record or findings of fact on each of the elements
of the rate base formula.' 27 The commission holds hearings on the
settlement, takes evidence both in support of and against the settlement,
and determines whether or not to approve it. 121 In making this decision,

commissions do not use the traditional rate base method, but consider a
number of other factors. These factors include whether the settlement is
in the "public interest"; 129 whether the settlement comports favorably
with the possible outcome if there were no agreement;30 whether the
negotiation process was reasonable;"' whether a range of interests is
represented by the parties who sign the agreement; 13 2 and whether the
settlement is supported by substantial evidence.133
This approach to the nonunanimous settlement process is well
illustrated by the 1989 decision of the Kentucky Public Service

Comm'n, 112 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 215, 218-19 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1990);
In re Rules of Practice & Procedure, No. 110, 1993 WL 562148 (N.M. Pub. Util. Comm'n
Oct. 4, 1993); In re Procedures for Settlement & Stipulation Agreements, Nos. 90-M-0255,
92-M-0138, 1992 WL 487888 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 24, 1992). John M. Katko,
Note, Negotiated Ratemaking and the Public Service Commission: Adjusting Its Present
Structure to Ensure Fairness, 38 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1319, 1323 (1989).
127. At times, even after the development of a full evidentiary record, a commission
will use the second approach, considering the reasonableness of the settlement rather than
variables of the revenue requirement formula. See, e.g., City of Somerville v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 865 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). In City of Somerville, after extensive
hearings and the issuance of a report by the hearing examiners, the utility entered into a
nonunanimous settlement with several of the parties. The Commission held hearings on the
settlement agreement and approved it. In its findings of fact, the Commission did not detail
the underlying variables used to calculate the revenue requirement. Instead, the Commission
merely found the settlement to be "reasonable and in the public interest." Id. at 562 n. 14.
128. See, e.g., In re Commission's Rules of Practice & Procedure, 29 CPUC 2d 392,
Rule 51.6 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Sept. 28, 1988) (Nos. 88-09-060; 84-12-028); In re
Rules of Practice & Procedure, No. 110, 1993 WL 562148, at *33-34 (N.M. Pub. Util.
Comm'n Oct. 4, 1993) (No. 110); In re Procedures for Settlement & Stipulation
Agreements, 1992 WL 487888, at *19 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 24, 1992) (Nos.
90-M-0255, 92-M-0138). If the commission does not approve the settlement, it will allow
the parties to renegotiate the agreement or litigate the case. See, e.g., 1992 WL 487888,
at *19.
129. See infra part V.A.
130. See infra part V.C.
131. See infra part V.D.
132. See infra part V.E.
133. See infra part V.B.
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concerned the rate treatment for a new electric generating facility, Trimble
County, constructed by Louisville Gas & Electric (LG&E). From the time
the plant was originally authorized in 1978 through the next decade,
intervenors including the Kentucky Attorney General, the county, and
consumer groups had questioned in a number of cases the need for the
new plant.' 35 Finally, after construction was nearly complete, the
Commission refused to allow the utility to collect rates to pay for twentyfive percent of the plant.136 The utility appealed this decision, and the
Commission opened a new docket7 to determine the rate treatment for the
3
disallowed portion of the plant.
LG&E and the parties to the case, including the intervenors and
3
Commission staff, then began to engage in settlement negotiations. 1
LG&E made proposals for certain rate reductions and dismissal of its
appeal, but the intervenors wanted not only a reduction in rates, but also
refunds of rates paid for construction of the disallowed portion of the plant
and payment of their attorneys' fees. 139 When LG&E would not consider
payment of either refunds or attorneys' fees, the negotiations with the
intervenors broke down. LG&E then continued in its discussions with the
Commission staff and reached a nonunanimous settlement with the staff
for a rate reduction and dismissal of the appeal."4
LG&E then presented the agreement to the Commission, which held
hearings on the reasonableness of the settlement. While professing to place
the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the settlement on
LG&E and the staff,' 41 the Commission merely reviewed the events

135. See, e.g., In re Louisville Gas & Electric Co., No. 8924 (Ky. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n May 16, 1984); In re Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., No. 8616 (Ky. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Mar. 2, 1983).
136. In re Formal Review of the Current Status of Trimble County Unit No. 1, No.
9934 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n April 20, 1989).
137. In re Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 348, 350 (Ky.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989).
138. Id. at 354-55.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 355.
141. Id. at 358.
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leading up to the settlement, compared the ratepayer benefits of the
settlement to the maximum benefit it assumed ratepayers would otherwise
receive, and concluded that the settlement was reasonable, The
Commission made no attempt to examine the reasonableness of the
stipulated rates using the traditional standard. 42 Instead, it based much
of its decision on what it perceived to be the unreasonable position taken

by intervenors in the negotiation process. 43 As the trial court held in
reversing the order:

[T] he entire proceeding before the PSC regarding the settlement
agreement can be considered nothing more than the most
summary of proceedings with witnesses for LG&E and the PSC
staff cheer-leading in favor of the agreement. The

[Commission] clearly placed the burden upon the intervenors
to demonstrate that the settlement agreement was unreasonable
and/or unlawful.'"
Because most commissions have a tendency to take this informal
approach to approving settlements, an approach which represents a
significant departure from traditional rate base ratemaking, this Article
will focus primarily on the use of this method.
III. The Statutory Basis for Nonunanimous Settlement of Rate Cases
In examining the propriety of nonunanimous rate case settlements,
the initial issue is whether there is statutory authorization for such a
142. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
143. In re Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 348, 354 (Ky.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989). The Commission noted:
Despite LG&E's firm opposition to paying the Intervenors' attorney fees, the
Intervenor Group persisted in its efforts. The affidavits demonstrate that the
Intervenor Group was so intent on recovering $1.6 million of attorney fees that
the group proposed increasing future electric rates so that LG&E could recoup
its payment from the ratepayers. The Intervenor Group's proposal would
effectively transform LG&E into a mere conduit by which the Intervenor Group
would recover its attorneys fees by taxing the ratepayers.
Id.
144. Kentucky ex rel. Cowan v. Kentucky Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 120 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 168, 173-74 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1991), aff'd, 862 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1993). The court also expressed concern that the chairman of the Commission and a
Commission member communicated at a luncheon meeting with LG&E's president prior to
filing a formal settlement offer with the Commission. Id. at 170.
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procedure. Three major statutory arguments have been raised against the
nonunanimous settlement process: (1) that commission enabling acts do
not permit commission staff to participate in settlement negotiations or,
alternatively, do not allow settlement without the consent of governmental
intervenors; (2) that statutory provisions allowing for settlements of
administrative cases apply only if all parties consent; and (3) that, in the
absence of unanimous settlement, enabling acts require full evidentiary
hearings. A review of these arguments demonstrates that, although the
first has little merit, the second and third raise serious doubts about
whether nonunanimous settlements of rate cases are statutorily permissible
under most enabling acts.
A.

The Role of Staff and Governmental Intervenors

One court has held that because of the unique nature of the
commission's staff, it cannot be a party to a settlement agreement. In In
re New England Telephone & Telegraph Co.,"4 the court noted that the
Vermont Public Service Board's enabling act charged it only with the duty
to assure adequate utility service at just and reasonable rates. Therefore,
the court reasoned, the staff counsel lacked the authority to enter into
agreements because it was impossible for it to obtain authority from its
client, the Board, to do so."
This reasoning is overly formalistic and shows a misunderstanding
of how an administrative staff functions. As the court recognized in New
England Telephone, the staff regularly takes positions in cases, filing
direct and rebuttal testimony and cross-examining witnesses.' 47 The staff
does not receive formal authority from the board to take particular
positions in these cases. Rather, the staff operates as a bona fide party:
investigating the facts and testifying in regard to its findings, hiring expert
witnesses, and making arguments on both law and facts. 4 ' "[I1n none
of its activities is Staff subject to direction by the Commission; Staff is
instead an autonomous participant making its presentations to the

145. In re New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 382 A.2d 826, 836 (Vt. 1977).
146. Id. at 835-36. Although this case did concern a nonunanimous settlement, its
holding would be applicable to unanimous settlements as well.
147. Id. at 835-36.
148. Attorney Gen. v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 808 P.2d 606, 609 (N.M.
1991).
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Commission and eliciting rulings from it." 49 By their very nature,
administrative agencies serve investigative, prosecutorial, and judicial
functions. 150 If the staff, as the prosecutorial arm of the commission,
decides to take a position in a rate case, it should not matter whether the
staff presents this position through litigation or a proposed settlement. No
provision of the traditional statutory schemes precludes such activity by
151
staff.
Some government intervenors make the converse argument that the
relevant statutes preclude settlements without their participation. The
standard enabling act for a legislatively created consumer
representative' 52 provides that it will represent the interests of residential
and small business ratepayers in public utility proceedings. 153 Some of
these representatives argue that this authority bars commissions from
approving settlements which the representatives oppose. 154 This
argument, however, ignores the function of these consumer offices. These
representatives' legislative grant of power to advocate on behalf of a
particular group of consumers is not equivalent to the authority to veto
an agreement considered contrary to the public interest.' 55
B.

Statutory Authorization for Settlement of Administrative Cases

When a utility proposes new rates, the commission has the statutory
authority to suspend rates and to hold hearings on their justness and
reasonableness. 156 While most commission enabling statutes do not
explicitly allow for the settlement of cases, many state administrative
149. Id. at 609-610 (noting problem that settlement would be impossible in case in
which staff is only party besides the utility).
150. See generally I KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 2.3 (3d ed. 1994).
151. Staff's participation in settlement discussions, however, may raise problems in
regard to the balance of power in the negotiation process. See infra notes 236-239 and
accompanying text.
152. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 350.061 (West 1980); MD. CODE ANN. art. 78,
§§ 14, 15 (1991); TEX. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1446c, § 15A (West 1980 & Supp. 1994).
154. Bryant v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 877 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Ark. Ct. App.
1994); City of El Paso v. Public Util. Comm'n, 839 S.W.2d 895, 904-05 (Tex. Ct. App.
1992), aff'd in part, 883 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1994).
155. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 877 S.W.2d at 597; City of El Paso, 839 S.W.2d
at 904-905.
156. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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procedure acts, which are applicable to public utility commissions, have
specific provisions that provide for settlements.' 5 7 The Model
Administrative Procedure Act (Model APA), for example, states: "Unless
precluded by law, informal disposition may be made of any contested case
by stipulation, agreed settlement, consent order, or default.""'
Courts are divided in their interpretation of such language. Two
courts have held that such a provision allows only unanimous
agreements.' 59 Reading the term "settlement" literally, they require
consent of all parties. In construing language identical to the Model APA,
for example, the Illinois Supreme Court observed: "In order for the
commission to dispose of a case by settlement . . . all of the parties and
intervenors must agree to the settlement. "160
A number of other jurisdictions, however, read their enabling acts
and administrative procedure acts to allow nonunanimous settlements
without full adjudicatory hearings.' 6 ' They contend that settlement in
the regulatory context has a different meaning from settlement in
traditional civil litigation. These jurisdictions base their interpretation not
on the statutory language of the commission enabling acts or the
administrative procedure acts but on a case that interpreted the federal
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). In that case, Pennsylvania Gas &
Water Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 62 the court rejected a
customer's challenge to a nonunanimous settlement approved by the
Federal Power Commission:

157. See, e.g., MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT [hereinafter MODEL
APA] § 9(d), 15 U.L.A. 207 (1981); see also 15 U.L.A. 137 (1981) (table of jurisdictions
in which Model Act has been adopted).
158. MODEL APA § 9(d), 15 U.L.A. 207 (1981).
159. Business & Professional People for Pub. Interest v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n,
555 N.E.2d 693, 700 (I11.1989); Kentucky Am. Water Co. v. Kentucky ex rel. Cowan, 847
S.W.2d 737, 740-41 (Ky. 1993).
160. 555 N.E.2d at 700.
161. See, e.g., In re Public Serv. Co., 72 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 660 (Ind. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1986); In re Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PTR)
130 (Iowa Commerce Comm'n 1982); Attorney Gen. v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
808 P.2d 606 (N.M. 1991); City of El Paso v. Public Util. Comm'n, 883 S.W.2d 179 (Tex.
1994); Bryant v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 877 S.W.2d 594 (Ark. Ct. App. 1994);
City of Abilene v, Public Util. Comm'n, 854 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
162. Pennsylvania Gas & Water Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 463 F.2d 1242 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
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"[SIettlement" carries a different connotation in administrative
law and practice from the meaning usually ascribed to
settlement of civil actions in a court. . . . [In agency
proceedings settlements are frequently suggested by some, but
not necessarily all, of the parties; if on examination they are
found equitable by the regulatory agency, then the terms of the
settlement form the substance of an order binding on all the
parties, even though not all are in accord as to the result. This
is in effect a "summary judgment" granted on "motion" by the
litigants where there is no issue of fact.
Only by exercising such "summary judgment" or
"administrative settlement" procedures when called for can the
usual interminable length of regulatory agency proceedings be
brought within the bounds of reason and the agencies'
163
competence to deal with them.
Citing this language and relying on the public policy favoring settlement
of disputes, a number of jurisdictions interpret their statutory schemes to
permit nonunanimous settlements of cases."6
The basis for this interpretation is quite weak. The enabling acts
require hearings on the record, and the administrative procedure acts
allow for settlements. No court or commission that permits contested
settlements without full evidentiary hearings cites any statutory language
or legislative history to support this practice. Nor do they identify any
textual basis in the relevant statutes that suggests that settlement in the
regulatory context connotes something different than settlement of civil
litigation. 165 Indeed, even the court in Pennsylvania Gas & Water
acknowledged that, while the federal APA allows for the settlement of
66
cases, it does not, by its terms, allow for nonunanimous settlements.'
Instead of examining the language of the applicable enabling or
administrative procedure acts, the courts permitting nonunanimous
settlements merely rely on conclusory assertions about public policy
163. Id. at 1246.
164. See, e.g., In re Public Serv. Co., 72 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 660, 683-84 (Ind.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986); see also Attorney Gen. v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
808 P.2d 606, 610 (N.M. 1991); In re Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 130, 146 (Iowa Commerce Comm'n 1982).
165. Nor do they explain the reason the utility must be a party to the settlement if
settlement means something different in the regulatory context.
166. Pennsylvania Gas & Water Co., 463 F.2d at 1247.
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favoring expeditious resolution of cases. 167 But as one court has

observed in rejecting the concept of nonunanimous settlements, public
policy concerns, such as the exigencies of a rate case, do not constitute
grounds for a commission to exceed its statutory authority.' 6
More importantly, most cases allowing nonunanimous settlements
do not recognize the limited nature of the Pennsylvania Gas & Water
holding. The court in that case likened contested settlements to summary
judgments. It approved the contested settlement precisely because the
Commission had accepted as true all of the factual allegations of the
customer challenging the settlement. The court observed: "If the
Commission were required in a case such as this one to hold a full and
formal evidentiary hearing despite the fact that it accepted all of a
participant's factual allegations as true and still found their conclusions
to be wanting, the settlement procedure would be rendered
meaningless." 16 9 Most state commissions that have approved contested
settlements, however, do not use a summary judgment standard. Instead,
they forgo full hearings even when there are contested issues. 70 Even
those that purport to apply a summary judgment standard often ignore it
when faced with contested facts.' 7 '

167. But see Inre Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 130,
145-46 (Iowa Commerce Comm'n 1982) (suggesting that intervenor has burden to show that
Administrative Procedure Act's use of "settlement" language means unanimous agreement,
although acknowledging that statutory scheme does not expressly allow for nonunanimous
settlements).
168. Missouri ex rel. Fischer v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 645 S.W.2d 39, 43 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982).
169. Pennsylvania Gas & Water Co., 463 F.2d at 1251.
170. See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Public Util. Comm'n, 883 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1994);
In re Nine Mile Point Two Nuclear Generating Facility, 78 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 23
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986).
171. See, e.g., In re Public Serv. Co., 72 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 660, 687 (Ind.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986). Using the summary judgment standard in the rate case context,
the test would be whether there is any genuine issue of fact as to the utility's revenue
requirement provided by the agreement, assuming all the facts as presented by parties
opposing the settlement to be true. See Pennsylvania Gas & Water Co., 463 F.2d at 1252.
In Public Service Co., although the Commission professed to use such a standard, it instead
applied the test of whether "issues of material fact remained in conflict and whether adoption
of the terms of the settlement proposal would be in the public interest." Public Serv. Co.
at 687. There is a significant difference between these two standards. The first focuses on
the elements of a traditional rate case; the second ignores those elements and replaces them
with a vague public interest test.
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Requirement in Enabling Statutes of Full Evidentiary Hearings

Three courts have held that, in the absence of unanimity, commission
enabling acts require full evidentiary rate base hearings.17 However,
several other courts and commissions have ruled that the enabling statutes
do not require full evidentiary hearings before approval of nonunanimous
agreements.' 7 3 Courts that permit nonunanimous settlements without full
hearings disregard the enabling acts' traditional requirement of findings
in regard to the justness and reasonableness of approved rates. In the
absence of unanimous consent, the statutes require full evidentiary
hearings in every case.
A number of the courts which allow nonunanimous settlements cite
the Supreme Court decision in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power
Commission,'74 another Federal Power Commission (FPC) rate case, in
support of the proposition that the enabling acts allow such
settlements.' 75 In Mobil, after an extensive record had been made in
hearings, a settlement proposal agreed to by a large majority of all
interests was approved by the Commission.17 6 The State of New York
challenged this settlement because it lacked unanimous support. 7 7 The
Court rejected this challenge. It held first that the Commission clearly had
the power to admit the agreement into the record.'
The Court then
adopted the holding of the court of appeals affirming the Commission
decision:
No one seriously doubts the power-indeed, the duty-of FPC
to consider the terms of a proposed settlement which falls to
receive unanimous support as a decision on the merits .... We
172. Business & Professional People for Pub. Interest v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n,
555 N.E.2d 693, 704 (Ill. 1989); Kentucky Am. Water Co. v. Kentucky ex rel. Cowan, 847
S.W.2d 737, 740-41 (Ky. 1993); State ex rel. Monsanto Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 716
S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1986); State ex rel. Fischer v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 645 S.W.2d 39
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
173. Bryant v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 877 S.W.2d 594, 599-600 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1994); Attorney Gen. v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 808 P.2d 606, 610-11
(N.M. 1991).
174. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 417 U.S. 283 (1974).
175. Bryant, 877 S.W.2d at 599-600; New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 808 P.2d at
610-11.
176. 417 U.S. at 296-98.
177. Id. at 312.
178. Id. at 312.
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agree with the D.C. Circuit that even "assuming that under the
Commission's rules [a party's] rejection of the settlement
rendered the proposal ineffective as a settlement, it could not,
and we believe should not, have precluded the Commission
from considering the proposal on its merits."'79
If a proposal enjoys unanimous support from all of the
immediate parties, it could certainly be adopted as a settlement
agreement if approved in the general interest of the public. But
even if there is a lack of unanimity, it may be adopted as a
resolution on the merits, if FPC makes an independent finding
supported by "substantial evidence on the record as a whole"
that the proposal will establish "just and reasonable" rates for
the area. 8 o
Relying upon the "independent finding" language of Mobil, a number
of commissions and courts read the decision as allowing commissions to
forgo full hearings in rate cases and to approve nonunanimous settlements
if they make independent findings that the agreements are in the public
interest.18"' While these courts acknowledge that in Mobil the FPC held
traditional rate hearings and made its decision on an extensive evidentiary
record, they contend that the case does not require full-blown rate
hearings, but allows flexible procedures for considering nonunanimous
settlements. 8 2 They assert that as long as the record contains sufficient
evidence to support the settlement, the agreement strikes a fair balance
between the ratepayers and the utility, and the contesting parties have had

179. Id. at 313-14 (quoting Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 283 F.2d 204, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1960)).
180. Id. at 314, (quoting Placid Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d 880,
883 (5th Cir. 1973) (emphasis in original)).
181. See, e.g., Bryant v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 877 S.W.2d 594, 599-600
(Ark. Ct. App. 1994); In re Public Serv. Co., 72 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 660, 685 (Ind.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986); In re Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 130, 146 (Iowa Commerce Comm'n 1982).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 465 A.2d 829, 833 n.3 (D.C.
1983) (rejecting argument that Mobil is inapplicable unless a full administrative record has
been established); In re Public Serv. Co., 72 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 660, 685 (Ind. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1986) ("Although an administrative settlement must be approved on the basis
of an adequate record, the procedures from which this record is derived are quite flexible.").
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an opportunity to present their positions, the requirements of Mobil have
been met. 183
This reading of Mobil is incorrect. The Mobil Court in no way

rejected the requirement of traditional rate hearings in nonunanimous
settlement cases. By observing that unanimous agreements should be
approved if they are "in the general interest of the public," 18 4 the Court

indicated that such hearings were not required when all parties are in
agreement. But, in regard to nonunanimous settlements, the Court noted
that they "may be adopted as a resolution on the merits, if FPC makes an
independent finding supported by 'substantial evidence on the record as
a whole' that the proposal will establish 'just and reasonable' rates for the
area."' 85 By using the language "on the merits," the Court did not
merely envision approval of the settlement agreement under some
nebulous public interest standard, but endorsement reflecting an
independent determination "on the merits" that the settlement established
"just and reasonable" rates.' 86 Such approval necessarily requires the
development of a full case record.

183. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Public Util. Comm'n, 378 N.E.2d 480, 483 (Ohio
1978) (although no testimony presented on rate of return, court affirmed order approving
nonunanimous settlement, noting that "the commission afforded appellants full opportunity
to present evidence with respect to all contested issues"); City of Abilene v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 854 S.W.2d 932, 939 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) ("[tlhe procedure used in this case
offered adequate opportunity for all parties to present their positions for the Commission's
consideration"). See generally In re Procedures for Settlement & Stipulation Agreements,
Nos. 90-M-0255, 92-M-0138, 1992 WL 487888, at *12 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar.
24, 1992).
184. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 417 U.S. 283, 314 (1974).
185. Id. at 314.
186. Business & Professional People for Pub. Interest v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n,
555 N.E.2d 693, 704 (I11. 1989). In that case, the court reversed a Commission order
approving a nonunanimous settlement because the order was based on the settlement
agreement, not on the merits. The court observed that "[a]bsent statutory law to the contrary,
we have no quarrel with the Commission's ability to consider a settlement proposal not
agreed to by all of the parties and the intervenors as a decision on the merits, as long as the
provisions of such a proposal are within the Commission's power to impose, the provisions
do not violate the [Public Utilities] Act, and the provisions are independently supported by
substantial evidence in the whole record." Id. See also City of Somerville v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 865 S.W.2d 557, 562 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); In re Idaho Power Co., 102 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 139, 148 (Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n 1989) (Miller, Comm'r, separate
opinion).
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The phrase "just and reasonable," which is contained in public utility
commission enabling acts, is a term of art.'87 It was incorporated into
public utility statutes in response to Smyth v. Ames. Although the
constitutional fair value standard established by Smyth has been
abandoned, its requirement of a full examination of the utility's rate base,
operating expenses, and reasonable rate of return as a basis for setting
rates has become an essential component of ratemaking statutes. 88
Traditional rate base ratemaking requires an evidentiary record as well
as findings of fact based on this record.' 8 9 In other words, under these
statutes, when confronted with a nonunanimous settlement, the issue for
a commission is not whether the settlement proposal reasonably balances
the interests of ratepayers or whether substantial evidence supports that
particular agreement."9 Instead, as in any rate case, a commission must
make findings on the merits regarding rate base, operating expenses, rate
of return, and rate design.
For these reasons, the flexible hearings approach adopted by most
commissions in reviewing nonunanimous settlements is prohibited by
traditional statutes. While such hearings might expedite the process and
allow for more efficient processing of cases, commissions do not have
statutory authority to use such a process in the absence of unanimous
consent. 9 ' In their attempts to handle the complexity and demands of
these cases, the commissions, with the blessing of a number of courts,
have ignored the previously recognized requirements of traditional rate
base hearings.
IV. Nonunanimous Settlement of Rate Cases as a Dispute Resolution
Mechanism
Even if the enabling statutes permit commissions to approve
nonunanimous settlements without traditional rate hearings, it is unclear
whether such a process is a valid dispute resolution mechanism. While
commentators and commissioners have preached the value of
187. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text. See generally PIERCE &
GELLHORN, supra note 79, at 100-101.
188. See supra notes 65-85 and accompanying text. See generally PIERCE & GELLHORN
supra note 79, at 101.
189. Business & ProfessionalPeople, 555 N.E.2d at 700.
190. Id. at 702; State ex rel Fischer v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 645 S.W.2d 39, 43 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982).
191. 645 S.W.2d at 43.
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nonunanimous settlement as a means of expediting the processing of
cases,1 92 they have failed to examine in-depth all the issues raised by
this departure from traditional ratemaking methods. 93
In recent years, a significant amount of literature has developed

concerning the functioning of different dispute resolution systems and the
selecting of a process for dispute resolution.

94

Although few of these

commentators have addressed the area of public utility regulation, 195
their insights can be very helpful in identifying general principles for
evaluating the benefits and weaknesses of the nonunanimous settlement

process. While rate cases differ in some respects from environmental, civil
rights, domestic relations, and other civil controversies, these disputes all
raise some common issues. These issues include the equity of the process,
the legitimacy of the system, and the administration of justice. Rate cases
are not entirely sui generis. Therefore, it is useful to expand any
examination of the propriety of nonunanimous settlements beyond the

narrow issues of the arcane world of rate regulation.
The literature on dispute resolution has identified a number of factors

for evaluating the quality of dispute resolution mechanisms.'96 Five of
192. See, e.g., In re Commission's Rules of Practice & Procedure, No. 87-11-053
at *4 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Nov. 25, 1987) (Westlaw, PUR Database); In re Procedures
for Settlement & Stipulation Agreements, Nos. 90-M-0255, 92-M-0138, 1992 WL 487888,
at *2 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 24, 1992); Morgan, supra note 16, at 76-78; Marilyn
O'Leary, Negotiated Settlements in Utility Regulation, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 21, 1986,
at 11.
193. But see Katko, supra note 126 (addressing problems of nonunanimous settlement
in a particular case before the New York Public Service Commission).

194. See, e.g., POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 2; DOUGLAS J. AMY, THE
POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION (1987); JEROLD AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT
LAW: RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LAWYERS (1983); Richard Delgado, ADR and the
Dispossessed: Recent Books About the Deformalization Movement, 14 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
145 (1988); Richard Delgado et al., Fairnessand Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 1359; Harry T. Edwards, Alternative
Dispute Resolution: PanaceaorAnathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986); Owen M. Fiss,
Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Philip J. Harter, Dispute

Resolution and Administrative Law: The History, Needs, and Future of a Complex
Relationship, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1393 (1983-1984); David Luban, The Quality of Justice,
66 DENV. U. L. REV. 381 (1989); Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory
and Practiceof Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133 (1985); Sally E. Merry,
Disputing Without Culture, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2057 (1987) (reviewing STEPHEN B.
GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985)).
195. See Morgan, supra note 16; van Hook, supra note 36; Raab, supra note 107.
196. See, e.g., Robert A. Baruch Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals
of Civil Justice: Jurisdictional Principlesfor Process Choice, 1984 WiS. L. REV. 893;
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the most significant factors are: (1) the efficiency of the process; (2) the
balance of power among the parties in the process; (3) the legitimacy of
the process; (4) the effect of the process on human relationships; and (5)
the role of the process in clarifying fundamental policy issues.'9 7 In this
part, the Article will describe each of these factors, reviewing the dispute
resolution literature on each of them. The Article will then examine the
nonunanimous settlement process in light of each factor, comparing this
process with traditional rate base regulation and the unanimous settlement
process. Throughout this discussion, the Article will focus on the
problems that representatives of captive ratepayers face as intervenors in
rate proceedings.
A.

The Efficiency of the Process

The first factor which needs to be evaluated in judging a dispute
resolution mechanism is the efficiency of the process. As one commentator
has observed:
Minimizing the cost of administration of social enterprises,
although rather pedestrian by comparison to the other goals
, is a well established and independent societal goal. Even
where action must be undertaken in the public interest to
achieve desired goals the action should itself be conducted so
as to consume as few resources as possible in administrative
costs. 9
In the rate regulation context, because of the time and resources devoted
to rate cases by commission staff, utility managers, intervening parties,
and the commissioners themselves, administrative costs can be quite
significant. Accordingly, it is often argued that the settlement process,
especially with respect to nonunanimous settlements, contributes to
process-related savings.
Commissions assert that settlement of rate cases conserves public and
private resources. Noting the increasingly complex nature of some rate

Luban, supra note 194; Frank E.A. Sander, Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: An

Overview, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1985).
197. Bush, supra note 196, at 908-21; Luban, supra note 194, at 401-17; Sander,
supra note 196, at 13-15.
198. Bush, supra note 196, at 920.
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cases, commissions urge settlement as a means to remove the burden of
the procedural formalities of adjudicatory hearings from their staffs. 1"
They also contend that settlement avoids the risks to the commissions of

appellate litigation. 2" Further, commissions point to the savings of time
and money for utility management and staff which would otherwise be
involved in the full litigation of a case.201 Moreover, they assert that
settlement expedites the process of information-gathering for both the
parties and the commission.2 2 Commissions contend that formal
litigation fosters extreme posturing by the different parties and the
coloring of information presented as evidence, both of which obstruct an
expeditious exchange of ideas and data. 3
Some commissions have suggested that a nonunanimous settlement
rule is required to achieve these benefits. Without such a rule, it is feared,

an inactive party or obstructionist consumer intervenor may boycott any
negotiations, arbitrarily blackball a reasonable settlement, and force fullscale hearings. 2" As a result, any savings of time and resources derived
from the settlement process would be wasted.

199. See, e.g., In re Commission's Rules of Practice & Procedure, No. 87-11-053 at
*4 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Nov. 25, 1987) (Westlaw, PUR Database); In re Chesapeake
& Potomac Tel. Co., 84 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 364, 369 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1987); In re Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 348, 364-65 (Ky.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989); In re Procedures for Settlement & Stipulation Agreements, Nos.
90-M-0255, 92-M-0138, 1992 WL 487888, at *2 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 24,
1992); In re Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 52 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 304, 306-307 (Ohio
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1983); In re El Paso Elec. Co., 101 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 405,
409 (Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1988). See generally Brock, supra note 105, at 2, 20;
Morgan, supra note 16, at 24-42; Raab, supra note 107, at 66, 88-92.
200. In re Nine Mile Point Two Nuclear Generating Facility, 78 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 23, 29 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986).
201. See, e.g., id. at 30; In re Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 84 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 364, 369 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1987); In re El Paso Elec. Co., 101 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 405, 409 (Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1988).
202. See Question 2: Dispute Resolution, supra note 115, at 35.
203. See id. at 34 (quoting Pennsylvania Commissioner William Smith stating
"[flormal litigation is expensive, time consuming, and tends to foster extreme positions on
the part of the litigants").
204. See supra notes 121-124 and accompanying text.
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The limited empirical research on the settlement of rate cases does
not wholly support the claims of its proponents in regard to processrelated savings. While no study of the time savings of the nonunanimous
settlement process has been made, the few studies addressing unanimous
settlements show that the process of negotiating these settlements takes
substantial time. For example, Jonathan Raab's study of the unanimous
settlement of the Pilgrim Nuclear Plant case found that the settlement
process required considerable expenditures of time and money." s
Settlement discussions in that case began only after the evidentiary
hearings were completed. All the parties interviewed were skeptical about
the usefulness of negotiations any earlier in the process. 2" As one
participant stated:
A settlement would not have made sense either prior to or early
in the hearings. We needed to get all the information out on the
table. Otherwise, the settlement would have become a back
room deal, and not a creative solution based on the evidence
and the parties' different expectations of the future. Until we
had developed the case on paper, we would not have known
how to set all the parameters in the settlement, and it would
have been rather arbitrary.2"7
Although, as Raab notes, it is possible that this exchange of information
could have been more expeditiously accomplished without formal
evidentiary hearings, 2" even informal, technical information meetings
would have required considerable commitments of time.
While it can be argued that studies such as Raab's support a
nonunanimous settlement rule, there is no indication in any of these cases
that the cause of delay was an obstructionist intervenor. In the cases
analyzed, there were only limited process-related savings, which were due

205. Raab, supra note 107, at 133, 143 (concluding that settlement of the Pilgrim
generating plant case in Massachusetts, after conclusion of hearings, could not be credited
with significant resource savings).
206. Id. at 143.
207. Id. at 143. In Jonathan Brock's study of an independent telephone utility's
unanimous settlement of a rate case, he found that the negotiation process shaved time off
the proceedings, even though he also determined that a serious exchange of information
required substantial expenditures of time and resources by the parties and commission staff.
Brock, supra note 105, at 8-10.
208. Raab, supra note 107, at 143.
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to the complex and technical nature of rate disputes, rather than to an
arbitrary blackballer. Undoubtedly, a requirement of unanimous consent
lengthens the negotiation process to some extent. Studies of negotiating
groups have found that a unanimous decision-making rule usually
lengthens the negotiation process and creates a greater probability of group
impasses. 2 9 However, serious negotiations of rate cases require
substantial outlays of time and money regardless of the decision-making
rule used. While nonunanimous settlements of rate cases unquestionably
save some time and money, the extent of these savings is unclear and may.
be overestimated by proponents of such settlements.
B.

The Balance of Power Among the Parties in the Process

A second factor to be considered in evaluating the propriety of the
nonunanimous settlement process is the balance of power among the
parties in the process. Many commentators assert that one of our societal
goals is distributional justice-"the attainment of equity in the distribution
of society's resources, including all forms of wealth and power."210 For
the dispute resolution system, this goal translates into procedures that
protect the have-nots and counterbalance the power and wealth of the
haves.2" In other words, distributional justice is achieved when a
dispute resolution mechanism gives all parties equally valued input into
the decision-making process. 212
1.

The Importance of a Balance of Power in Negotiation

Settlement mechanisms do not exist in a vacuum. As Sally Engle
Merry has observed:
No [dispute resolution] process exists separately from its place
in the unfolding sequence of stages, which gives it meaning and
force. If parties are aware that a more coercive process will
ensue if mediation fails, the dynamics of the mediation will
differ sharply from "pure mediation," because the expectation

209. Leigh L. Thompson et al., Group Negotiation:Effects ofDecision Rule, Agenda,
and Aspiration, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 86, 92 (1988).
210. Bush, supra note 196, at 911.
211. Id. at 911-12; Luban, supra note 194, at 407-13.
212. See Luban, supra note 194, at 411.
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of an imposed settlement will inevitably alter the meaning of
the event for all the actors.2" 3
Therefore, the ability of each participant in any ADR process to wield its
power, through litigation, political clout, physical strength, or
psychological pressure, is an essential factor which must be considered
in determining the appropriateness of the use of that process to resolve
a particular problem.
Most commentators conclude that a relative balance of power among
the parties is a necessary component in socially just negotiations.2" 4
Without such a balance, there will be little incentive for good faith
negotiations by all parties.2" 5 The party with the superior power will not
be motivated to engage in serious dialogue if it knows that it can achieve
its goals outside of the negotiation process. In addition, even if discussions
take place, it is unlikely that they will lead to optimal solutions if there
is no balance of power. When a balance of power is established, the
parties are less able to use coercion and manipulation to achieve their
ends, and it is more likely that they will share information and reason
together in designing a settlement that addresses each party's interests.2" 6
Finally, without a balance of power, it is unlikely that the result will
be equitable. As Jerold Auerbach has observed: "Compromise only is an
equitable solution among equals; between unequals, it inevitably
reproduces inequality. "217 For example, a party with greater financial
resources and technical expertise will often attempt to intimidate weaker
213. Merry, supra note 194, at 2066.
214. See AMY, supra note 194, at 80 (in the context of environmental mediation,
author contends that mediation tends to be viewed as appropriate only when there is a
relative balance of power between the disputants); Amy, supra note 13, at 8; Brock, supra
note 105, at 15; Susskind, supra note 13, at 14 (In regard to environmental mediation, the
author asserts that "a mediator should probably refuse to enter a dispute in which the power
relationships among the parties are so unequal that a mutually acceptable agreement is
unlikely to emerge."). But see Susskind & McMahon, supra note 194, at 154. Susskind and
McMahon found that EPA demonstrations of negotiated rulemaking disprove the hypothesis
that such rulemaking will fail if one party has inordinate power goals without having to deal
with others. They found that environmental groups with less power were effective because
they were able to form coalitions with more powerful allies. In the nonunanimous settlement
context, however, such coalition formation is difficult for less powerful groups. See infra
notes 233-238 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Brock, supra note 105, at 17.
216. See generally AMY, supra note 194, at 92-93; Bob Rosin, EPA Settlements of
Administrative Litigation, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 370 (1985).
217. AUERBACH, supra note 194, at 136.
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parties into settlement. 2Is Faced with this pressure, parties with fewer

resources are likely to feel constrained to accept less than fair
outcomes.219 Such an outcome is especially likely when the negotiation
process is forced on the parties, as in situations of compulsory
mediation.220
2.

Formalism as a Tool of Power in Dispute Resolution

Formal adjudication is one instrument that can be used by less
powerful parties to protect their interests against more powerful
opponents. 22' The procedural safeguards afforded by adjudication serve
several functions. First, they create certain internal constraints on the
decision-maker. They require her to apply existing rules and standards to
the particular case. In addition, because of the repetitive nature of most

caseloads, they encourage her to consider a case in terms of the relevant
legal and factual issues, not the parties involved.222
Second, these safeguards provide external constraints on the decisionmaker. For example, disqualification, ex parte communication, and recusal
rules all help in controlling bias.223 While some of these procedures are
infrequently used, their mere existence creates an institutional check on
improper influence in the decision-making process.
Finally, these safeguards establish controls on the parties "by
defining the scope of the action, formalizing the presentation of evidence,
and reducing strategic options." 224 Rules of procedure, for example,

218. See AMY, supra note 194, at 143-45; see also Amy, supra note 13, at9 ("instead
of avoiding mediation or seeking to exclude other groups from the process, powerful interests
may actively embrace mediation as a way of co-opting their weaker opponents"); Susskind,
supra note 13, at 15 (commenting on the effects of leverage in mediation).
219. See generally Fiss, supra note 194, at 1076 ("the poorer party may be less able
to amass and analyze the information needed to predict the outcome of the litigation and thus
be disadvantaged in the bargaining process"); Susskind, supra note 13, at 15. Additionally,
informal processes open the door for decision-maker prejudices to influence the decisionmaking. See generally Delgado et al., supra note 194, at 1374, 1402.
220. AMY, supra note 194, at 146 ("A lack of voluntariness may undermine much of
the integrity and legitimacy of the mediation.").
221. Id. at 106; Richard L. Abel, Introduction to POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE,
supra note 2, at 1, 11 (arguing that formalism protects powerless such as defendants in
criminal cases and tenants in eviction actions). See generally Delgado et al., supra note 194.
222. Delgado et al., supra note 194, at 1368.
223. Id. at 1368-69.
224. Id. at 1374.
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require notice at each stage of a case, provide a formal schedule for the
litigation process, allow for an open exchange of information among the
parties, and mandate explicit findings of fact by the decision-maker. 2"
Similarly, rules of evidence limit the power of the parties in the
presentation of their cases, establish exclusions for irrelevant and
prejudicial evidence, provide an agenda for production of proof, require
foundations to establish the competency of witnesses and the reliability
of testimony, and limit the admissibility of prejudicial evidence.22 6
The limitations that formal rules impose upon the decision-maker and
the parties help to provide a level playing field for all of the parties. As
Owen Fiss has observed, "[j]udgment aspires to an autonomy from
distributional inequalities. ,227 Although imbalances of power can distort
the adjudication process, the procedural safeguards of that process can
restrict the undue influence of parties with superior power.22
The significance of formal procedures as tools for balancing power
in dispute resolution is well illustrated by the historical development of
the rules of traditional rate base regulation. As described earlier, in the
early nineteenth century consumers sought protection from legislatures to
counteract the superior economic power of railroads.229 As a result of
these efforts, legislatures established strong commissions that possessed
considerable power over railroads.23 Fearing unlimited control by
legislatures and commissions, railroads themselves sought relief in the
courts, and the Supreme Court created formal procedural protections to
counterbalance what it saw as the superior power of consumers. 23 ' With
the formal requirements of notice, hearings, findings of fact, and
substantive standards, the Court attempted to strike a balance between the
power of railroads and their consumers.

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 1371-73.
Id. at 1373-74.
Fiss, supra note 194, at 1078.
Id. at 1077-78.
See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
See supra part I.B.
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The Balance of Power and Nonunanimous Settlements

The balance of power in negotiations is certainly a key concern in
public utility disputes. Many conflicts among utilities, consumer groups,
and government intervenors are not merely the result of failures in
communication that can be resolved through improved dialogue.232 In
many rate cases, a battle over strong political interests lies underneath the
technical data and expert opinions. Issues such as the allocation of the
costs of new generating facilities, the rate treatment of cancelled nuclear
plants, the determination of rate design, and the proper rate of return
require the balancing of different political, social, and economic
interests.233 Given the importance of the balance of power among the
parties in the negotiation process, any assessment of the impact of
negotiated settlements on distributional justice must not ignore the relative
power of each party.
The nonunanimous settlement mechanism tends to give utilities
superior bargaining power in the negotiation process, especially in relation
to weaker intervenors. The utility has a power to which no other party
is entitled: the power to veto a settlement. In any negotiation, the utility
knows that the discussions end as soon as it walks away from the
bargaining table. If any other party withdraws, however, the negotiations
can continue, and the commission can approve a contested agreement in
a flexible hearing. Because representatives of groups such as captive
ratepayers fear that they may be left out of a settlement agreement, they
may be coerced and manipulated into an agreement they would otherwise
not accept.
The tendency of nonunanimous decision-making to foster coalition
formation aggravates this problem. One general study of coalition
formation found that, in three-person negotiation groups that followed
majority rule decision-making, two members usually formed a coalition
"to prevent the remaining negotiator from achieving his or her most
232. See generally AMY, supra note 194, at 228:
The fundamental flaw underlying any attempt to rely on
[alternative] dispute resolution to resolve public policy conflicts
is that such well-meaning efforts ultimately rest on a false
understanding of what politics is all about. Politics is not simply
about communication, it is about power struggles. It is not only
about common interests, but also about conflicting interests. And
it not only involves horse-trading, but competition between
conflicting values and different moral visions.
233. Krieger, supra note 96, at 648.
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important interests and to ensure that the two colluding members achieved
their most important interests." 234 The study also found that colluding
members tended to stick together for the duration of the negotiations
because they feared that a new coalition might be formed against
them.235
Coalition formation in rate cases may lead to a detrimental
manipulation of the negotiation process. Rate cases usually involve
multiple issues, and each party has varying degrees of interest in regard
to each of these issues. For example, an industrial intervenor might be
very interested in certain rate design issues and less concerned about the
amount of the rate hike. Because the utility must be a signatory to the
agreement, the nonunanimous settlement process may give intervenors the
incentive to ally themselves with the utility and to agree to provisions
demanded by the utility in which they have only moderate interest. In
return, the utility might accept their conditions. In this hypothetical, the
industrial intervenor might agree to the amount of a utility rate hike in
order to persuade the utility to agree to the intervenor's rate design
proposal. While that intervenor might have an interest in addressing the
rate hike issue, it will likely forgo that interest rather than endanger its
alliance with the utility. Although all the remaining intervenors may
strongly contest the amount of the rate hike, the agreement will be
presented to the commission as a settlement of all issues between the
utility and the industrial intervenor. Because the utility has a superior
capacity to form coalitions, the balance of power in negotiations becomes
even more distorted.
Participation of the commission staff in the nonunanimous agreement
may accentuate the power imbalance. The staff, as an arm of the
commission, wields significant power.236 Indeed, if the staff allies itself
with the utility, a bandwagon effect may be created, swaying other parties

234. Thompson et al.,
supra note 209, at 92. These groups also used an issue agenda
for decision-making. Id.
235. Id.
236. Cf. AMY, supra note 194, at 150 (observing that in context of environmental
mediation the presence of governmental representatives maximizes power imbalances).
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to join the agreement, albeit reluctantly.237 As one court that recognizes
the concept of nonunanimous settlements has noted:
[Nonunanimous agreements create] the possibility of an
unintentional shift of the burden of proof from the utility to the
opponents of the stipulation. There is a danger that when
presented with a ready-made solution, the Commission might
unconsciously require that the opponents refute the agreement,
rather than require the utility to prove affirmatively that the
proposed rates are just and reasonable. This danger is increased
when the Commission staff is a signatory party and is in a
position of advocating the stipulation.238
The vast majority of nonunanimous settlements include the utility and
commission staff but exclude consumer groups. 3
While most
commission staff members attempt to represent the public interest in good
faith and while some consumer groups adamantly object to all rate
increases, this coalition-building phenomenon raises serious distributional
justice questions. With the pressures of limited time and resources, the
commission staff might in good faith ally itself with the utility in order
to expedite negotiations and resolve a case.
The nonunanimous settlement process significantly affects the ability
of consumer groups to use the legitimate threat of formal hearings as a
weapon in negotiations. In most rate cases, the utility has significantly
more power than most intervenors. It has most of the technical
information regarding the relevant issues in the case within its control,
it usually has a permanent staff of experts, and it has the resources to hire
additional expert consultants. 2" Usually, however, it does not have
unlimited time to litigate cases and, like most litigants, it is concerned
237. But see In re Commission's Rules of Practice & Procedure, No. 87-11-053, at
*9 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Nov. 25, 1987) (Westlaw, PUR Database) (rejecting bandwagon
effect argument in approving rule allowing for nonunanimous settlements and stating: "We
wish to assure parties that it is the Commission and not the stipulating parties which must
make the decision in any matter. We are not bound to approve a stipulation or settlement
simply because it is offered.").
238. City of Abilene v. Public Util. Comm'n, 854 S.W.2d932, 938-39 (Tex. Ct. App.
1993). The court, however, approved the settlement without addressing whether or not the
commission had incorrectly shifted the burden of proof in that case. Id.
239. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
240. Utilities also wield significant influence with commissions. See infra notes 261265 and accompanying text.
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with the risk of losing the case. Besides obtaining its requested rate relief,
the utility is interested primarily in an expeditious hearing of its case. On
the other hand, many consumer groups, especially those representing the
interests of low-income and other captive customers, rely on the formal
procedural protections of the hearing process to offset the power of the
utility. By insisting that the utility defend its prima facie case and meet
statutory standards for each of the elements of the rate-making
formula24 ' and demanding that the commission render detailed findings
of fact on each of the elements, these consumer groups attempt to create
a more level playing field with their adversaries.
In some cases, the nonunanimous settlement process has the potential
to deprive consumer intervenors of the protections of formal procedures.
With a requirement of unanimous agreement, all parties would know that
they must negotiate within the shadow of the law.242 If these negotiations
fail, these parties would have the right to have their case heard at a
traditional rate base hearing. If the utility faces lengthy hearings,
presentation of numerous witnesses, difficulties with meeting certain
statutory standards, or the possibility of extended delays and appeals,
consumer intervenors may hold some power over the utility. The
effectiveness of these weapons becomes more limited with the use of
nonunanimous settlement. If the utility can obtain consent from staff and
perhaps one or two other intervenors, such as industrial customers,
consumer groups may be left out of the settlement and may have no
opportunity for a full-blown hearing.
The importance of formalism for power balancing is not merely
hypothetical; it is exemplified by the recent successes of consumer groups
in rate cases, and by the attempts of some utilities and commissions to use
the settlement process to offset these accomplishments.
A prime example is the Illinois Commerce Commission's handling
of Commonwealth Edison rate cases in the 1970s and 1980s. In the early
1970s, Edison embarked upon an ambitious construction program to add
six nuclear generating units.243 Forecasting increased load growths,

241. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
242. This term is used in the dispute resolution area to refer to the notion that
negotiations occur against the backdrop of possible full-scale litigation. See generally Robert
H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: the Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (introducing and discussing term).
243. See In re Commonwealth Edison Co., 84 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 469 (I11.
Commerce Comm'n 1987).
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Edison persuaded the Commission to approve certificates for these
plants.244
Throughout the 1970s and the early 1980s, consumer groups and
other intervenors aggressively challenged rate increases resulting from the
construction program in the Commission and the courts. These earlier
challenges, however, were largely unsuccessful. 245 Finally, in 1985,
various consumer and government intervenors challenged a Commission
order granting a $494.8 million rate increase for costs associated with one
of these plants . 2 4' These intervenors appealed the order, arguing that the
Commission erred by presuming that the costs of the plant were
reasonable, rather than requiring an affirmative showing of
reasonableness. 4 7 In April 1986, the trial court held in favor of the
intervenors and remanded the case to the Commission.24 8
After the trial court's decision, Edison proposed negotiations and,
shortly thereafter, entered into an agreement with a number of
governmental parties to settle rate issues concerning three additional
nuclear plants.249 Consumer groups attacked this nonunanimous
settlement, and in July 1987 the Commission, by a four to three vote,
rejected the settlement."' 0 Undeterred, Edison filed a new rate case and
entered into a new settlement with the Commission's staff and industrial

244. Id. at 477. Consumer, environmental, and "public interest" groups, as well as
governmental intervenors, objected to the construction of these plants, challenging Edison's
optimistic forecasts for increased load. See In re Commonwealth Edison Co., 50 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 221, 222-25 (I11.Commerce Comm'n 1982). In 1978, the commission
initiated its own investigation into the efficacy of this construction program, and, in 1980,
it directed Edison to complete its construction program in as timely and economic a manner
as possible. In re Commonwealth Edison Co., 84 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 469, 476 (I11.
Commerce Comm'n 1987).
245. See, e.g., People v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 448 N.E.2d 986 (I11.App. Ct.
1983); In re Commonwealth Edison Co., 50 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 221, 222-25 (Ill.
Commerce Comm'n 1982).
246. In re Commonwealth Edison Co., 71 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 81 (Il.
Commerce Comm'n 1985).
247. People ex rel. Hartigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 510 N.E.2d 865 (I11.
1987).
248. People ex rel. Hartigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 85 CH 1097, slip. op.
(Cir. Ct. of Cook County Apr. 29, 1986).
249. Carol McHugh, The $1.34 Billion Utility Bargain: Shedding Light on the Edison
Case, CHI. LAW., Dec. 1993, at 16.
250. Id. at 17; In re Commonwealth Edison Co., 84 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 469
(I11.Commerce Comm'n 1987).
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intervenors. After expedited proceedings, the Commission approved the

nonunanimous settlement.251
The Commonwealth Edison saga illustrates consumer intervenors'
use of formal procedures to attempt to balance the power in dispute
resolution. 52 After the Commission approved Edison's construction

program, the Commission continued to grant the utility's requests for rate
increases. But after Edison completed the new plants, consumer groups
effectively raised a procedural argument, the erroneous presumption of
reasonableness by the Commission, to attack a rate increase associated
with one of the plants. Just as the formal procedures of rate base
ratemaking established in Chicago, Milwaukee and Smyth protected
utilities from the power of commissions perceived to be overlysympathetic to ratepayers, consumer groups now used these same types
of procedures to counterbalance the power of the utility.25
The Edison cases also demonstrate the use of the nonunanimous
settlement process to thwart the use of formal procedures as a tool of
power. In other contexts, several commentators have suggested that one
of the reasons for the current upsurge in ADR has been the increased use
of the judicial process during the 1960s to expand entitlements for
disadvantaged groups who had not previously used those processes: for
example, women in domestic violence cases, low-income consumers in

credit and collection actions, and poor tenants in eviction proceedings. 254
Indeed, commentators argue that these disadvantaged groups have used
251. See In re Commonwealth Edison Co., 117 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 401 (I11.
Comm. Comm'n 1988); McHugh, supra note 249, at 17.
252. The Edison case is not an isolated attempt by a utility to use the nonunanimous
settlement process after consumer successes. In In re Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 107 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 348 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989), the utility entered into such a
settlement after the commission had disallowed twenty-five percent of a newly constructed
generating plant, and in In re Nine Mile Point Two Nuclear Generating Facility, 78 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 23 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986), the utility and the commission
staff used the nonunanimous settlement process in response to strong consumer challenges
to the Shoreham nuclear plant.
253. Unlike utilities, ratepayers may not have a constitutional right to particular rates.
Compare State ex rel. Jackson County v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 532 S.W.2d 20, 31 (Mo.
1975) (rejecting argument that ratepayers have a vested right in existing rates) with Nebraska
ex rel. Spire v. Northwestern Bell Tel., 445 N.W.2d 284, 297-98 (Neb. 1989) (recognizing
consumers' right to reasonable rates). The requirements for rate hearings contained in the
enabling statutes, however, give both utilities and ratepayers the rights to procedural
protections in those hearings.
254. See POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 3; Merry, supra note 194,
at 2072.
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the formal mechanisms of adjudication to balance power against their
opponents. In response, their opponents have proposed more informal
dispute resolution mechanisms to thwart this newly-gained power. 5
The history of the Edison case supports this hypothesis that recent
interest in ADR has been fueled by a desire to upset the balance of power
created by formal procedures. For over a decade, intervenors had
challenged Edison's nuclear construction programs. Although many of
these cases were lengthy proceedings involving complex issues, neither
the utility nor the Commission requested the use of the settlement process
and the abandonment of traditional rate base ratemaking. Throughout this
period, however, Edison was relatively successful in obtaining relief.
Edison conjured up the idea of informal, nonunanimous settlements of rate
cases only after consumer groups used the formal ratemaking procedures
to counterbalance Edison's power with the Commission. Without the
constraints of formalism, the utility obtained the Commission staff's assent
to a nonunanimous settlement and eventually the Commission's blessing
for the agreement. The utility, therefore, used the nonunanimous
settlement procedure to deprive intervenors of the power they had gained
through formal processes.
Admittedly, the Edison cases are unusual: they arose out of the
bygone era of nuclear plant construction and involved hundreds of millions
of dollars of rate increases. Commentators may argue that the desire of
the Commission and staff to approve the nonunanimous settlement resulted
from the unique exigencies of those cases and times. Without any evil
intent, commissions tried to address a difficult situation not entirely of
their making. It is also possible that, in situations less critical than those
in the Edison case, the settlement process might actually help to level the
playing field for less advantaged intervenors. Indeed, given the technical
complexity of rate cases and the limited resources of such intervenors, the
less formal setting of the bargaining table might give these intervenors
more power.256 This type of setting actually might help intervenors
become more powerful by organizing their own coalitions with the utility
or with other intervenbrs.

255. POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 3; Merry, supra note 194, at
2072.
256. In re Procedures for Settlement & Stipulation Agreements, Nos. 90-M-0255, 92M-0138, 1992 WL 487888, at *2 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 24, 1992).
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On the other hand, there are lessons to be learned from cases such
as Edison. In the current climate of increased deregulation, commissions
will face serious conflicts between the rights of large ratepayers with
access to alternative sources of service and captive customers with no such
access." 7 The balance of power issues in rate cases that have arisen over
the past twenty-five years will remain, and many representatives of captive
ratepayers may rely on the formal process in good faith to protect their
rights. In their desire to expedite the resolution of rate cases, it is
important that commissions and their staffs not lose sight of the impact
of nonunanimous settlements on the relative balances of power of the
parties in the dispute resolution process. Distributional justice requires a
level playing field, and the nonunanimous settlement process can have the
tendency to tip the balance in favor of the utility.
C.

The Impact on the Legitimacy of the System

The effect of nonunanimous settlements on the legitimacy of the
ratemaking system is the third factor that should be considered when
evaluating the appropriateness of the settlement processes. As Baruch Bush
observes:
Every society strives to ensure that its governing institutions
and structures appear legitimate in the eyes of its members.
Note that the goal is defined in terms of appearance and
perception, not some objective standard of fairness or political
economy. Even if the society denies certain citizens the right
to participate in decision-making, it may nevertheless achieve
legitimacy in the eyes of its members, if it appears that this is
an appropriate thing to do. Indeed, even the victims of the
denial may accept it as legitimate." 8
Thus, a determination of whether the nonunanimous settlement mechanism
enhances or diminishes the legitimacy of the regulatory system requires
an examination of the perceptions of fairness held by both the parties to
the proceeding and others who are affected by the decisions."

257. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
258. Bush, supra note 196, at 918.
259. Raab, supra note 107, at 77.
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When examining the legitimacy issue, it is important to note that the
regulatory system is not simply the unidirectional assertion of authority
by a commission over its regulated industries. Rather, it is a process of
ongoing interactions and relationships among the different
participants-commissioners, commission staff, utility personnel, and
intervenors-played out against the backdrop of the different legal and
political methods available to these parties. 2"
A number of political scientists and economists assert that most
commissions are dominated by the industries they regulate.2 6' They
argue that, although agencies are frequently created in response to a call
for reform, over years of regular contact a subtle relationship begins to
develop between the regulator and the regulated company.'26 Eventually,
the commission, looking for safety in all its decisions, surrenders its
power to the regulated companies.26 3 Other commentators contend that
regulators become overly sympathetic to the regulated industries, either
because they previously worked for the companies or because they have
plans for such employment in the future." 4 And still others assert that
well-organized utilities buy power from political parties that have electoral
and financial resources. Rational self-interested government officials strive
to maximize their wealth by adopting policies consistent with the interests
of the regulated company. 26
Commentators have challenged all these versions of the so-called
"capture theory" on both historical and empirical bases, 2" but few
question the fact that, at the very least, companies tend to exert significant
influence in the regulatory process. Regulators and regulated companies
develop a relationship of close mutual dependence. The companies rely
upon regulators for their revenues and profit. Most regulators by nature
are risk averse. Wishing to avoid blatant failures, regulators rely upon the
regulated companies to provide reliable and high quality service.267 "An
260. Krieger, supra note 96, at 656.
261. Id. at 651.
262. See MARVIN BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
74-84 (1955).
263. Id. at 86-95.
264. George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCi. 3, 11 (1971).
265. Id.
266. See Krieger, supra note 96, at 653-54.
267. See James Wilson, The Politicsof Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION
357, 376-77 (James Wilson ed., 1980).
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agency will be reluctant to push too hard with regulatory directives that
may cause, or plausibly be claimed to cause, service failures. Regulators
are similarly reluctant to enforce measures that may seriously impair the
financial health of the regulated industry.'268
Given these tendencies toward capture or, at the least, mutual
dependence of commissions and utilities, the legitimacy of the decisionmaking process in the regulatory system can often be a subject of
significant contention.269 Unanimous settlement of regulatory cases
enhances the legitimacy of the dispute resolution process. When traditional
adversaries work together to reach a consensus and the commission
eventually approves the settlement, the legitimacy of the process is
strengthened.27 When all parties have worked out a decision together,
they tend to be more willing to commit themselves to it.271
Unfortunately, however, the nonunanimous settlement process may
exacerbate legitimacy problems. Settlement discussions often involve ex
parte communications among the parties at unannounced and sometimes
secret meetings. 72 There is nothing nefarious in such contacts. Indeed,
the closed dispute resolution process purportedly encourages parties to be
candid in the exchange of information, discourages the posturing of more
public procedures, and fosters frank discussions of respective
positions.273 In the public utility commission context, however, closed
processes may increase the dangers raised by the already mutually
dependent relationship of staff and company officials. In fact, these kinds
of settlement discussions may expose commission staff to persistent
pressure to go along with a settlement or face the consequences of the
adverse effects that lengthy hearings may have on the financial health of
the company. Failure of commission staff to go along with a settlement
may also negatively impact their professional careers.274

268.
269.
project).
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Stewart, supra note 122, at 663.
See, e.g., Katko, supra note 126, at 1320 (discussing Nine Mile Point Two
Raab, supra note 107, at 340.
See Rosin, supra note 216, at 368.
Id. at 392.
Id.
See id. at 372.
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All ADR processes in commissions run the risk of fostering private
or secret meetings with commission staff. It is only natural for utility
managers to cooperate with agency officials with whom they have an
ongoing close relationship. The nonunanimous settlement procedure,
however, strengthens this tendency. Because utilities do not have to obtain
the consent of all the parties and because the commission staff has
significant influence over the commission,275 the nonunanimous
settlement procedure encourages utilities to reach an agreement with the
staff. The procedure fosters closed back room meetings with staff, without
the participation of other parties. 276 And, once the commission staff has
signed the agreement, without a unanimity requirement, other parties will
either be forced to join the settlement or face the uphill battle of
challenging the agreement in a flexible hearing before the commission.
The nonunanimous settlement system diminishes the perception of fairness
of commission decision-making.
A good illustration of this problem is the New York Public Service
Commission's proceedings in the mid-1980s concerning the rate base
allowance for the Nine Mile Point Two Nuclear Generating Facility.277
Throughout the construction of that plant, the most expensive nuclear
generating facility in the history of the United States, consumer groups
challenged the need for its construction. 278 As the plant neared
completion, the Consumer Protection Board (CPB), the state-funded
consumer advocate, 279 requested a Commission inquiry into the cost
overruns at the plant and the alleged mismanagement or imprudence of
the co-owners.280 In response, the Commission instituted a proceeding

275. See generally Lehr, supra note 18, at 23 ("While it is often said that regulators
are captured by the industries they regulate, it is often more true that they are captives of
their staff.").
276. The recently adopted New York settlement guidelines attempt to address this
problem by requiring notices of all negotiation meetings to all parties. In re Procedures for
Settlement & Stipulation Agreements, Nos. 90-M-0255, 92-M-0138, 1992 WL 487888, at
*17 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 24, 1992). The commission recognized that meetings
without notice are "too susceptible of impropriety to be tolerated." Id. at 6.
277. See In re Nine Mile Point Two Nuclear Generating Facility, 78 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 23 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986); Katko, supra note 126.
278. Katko, supra note 126, at 1319 (noting that the original price tag for the plant
was $400 million while its final cost was in excess of $6 billion); see Burstein v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 470 N.Y.S.2d 698 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
279. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW art. 20, §§ 550-53 (Consol. 1983).
280. Katko, supra note 126, at 1325.
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to investigate the prudence of all expenditures at the plant.28 But before
hearings began, the Commission staff and the utilities stunned intervenors
by submitting a proposed settlement to the Commission. This agreement,
reached in private negotiations, the record of which was kept secret,
required ratepayers to pay over $4.45 billion of the plant's costs and
contained the assurance that no investigations would be held in regard to
the prudence of the plant's construction costs. After expedited hearings,
the Commission approved the settlement.282
In response to attacks on the secret nature of the negotiations, the
Commission found that "in the circumstances of this case such
confidentiality may have been necessary to the development of the
settlement proposal."2" 3 But the Commission failed to recognize the
effect of this closed process on the perception of legitimacy of its decisionmaking process. As the dissenting commissioners observed in their
opinion:
The intervenors were forced to react to a fait accompli instead
of being permitted to have a voice in shaping an agreement.
Therefore, the record in this case is but poorly developed. For
example, the question of the cost impact of delays in
commencing construction was raised by intervenors early in the
prudency proceedings but was settled without adducing
evidence. . . .As it is, serious doubt remains as to whether or
not the construction duration on which the settlement is based
is appropriate. The same could be said for the other issues
24
which affect the cost of the plant.
281. In re Nine Mile Point Two Nuclear Generating Facility, 78 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 23, 25 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986).
282. The original agreement established a rate base allowance of $4.45 billion. Id.
at 25. The commission initially rejected the settlement, advising the parties that $4.16 billion
would be a sounder basis for a rate allowance for the plant. When the utilities agreed,
hearings were held on the revised settlement. Id. at 27.
283. Id. at 46. Although the commission had guidelines prohibiting negotiation without
notice to other parties, the commission approved the agreement because the guidelines were
not "legally binding rules" and "departure from the guidelines did not substantially impair
any party's right to be heard on the proposed settlement ......
Id. at 46-47.
284. Id. at 51-52. The commission's decision was motivated by its prior experience
of lengthy hearings on the Shoreham nuclear power plant. Apparently the Commission did
not want to undergo drawn-out prudence hearings in this case. Id. at 28-29.
One answer to the problem of a closed process is that staff can be precluded from the
settlement process. See generally Question 2: Dispute Resolution, supra note 115, at 34 (The
Commissioner expressed the opinion that "by keeping the staff out of negotiations, we have
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Again, it can be argued that the Commission opted for this closed
process solely because of the unique issues involved in the case. The
Commission in fact has recently adopted stronger rules precluding ex parte
contacts between its staff and other parties in the negotiation process."'
Nevertheless, as commissions confront difficult issues raised by a
competitive environment in the future, the legitimacy issues raised by this
case will be very real. Participants in collaborative decision-making
processes, such as negotiation, consider the process to be legitimate only
if they perceive that their interests were better served by that process than
by traditional adjudication. 8 6 Even if the commission staff operates in
good faith and refrains from any private negotiations with the utility, a
commission faces great difficulty in avoiding the appearance of unfairness
when it approves a settlement between its staff and the utility, excluding
the representatives of a significant segment of ratepayers, such as captive
customers, and failing to provide a full hearing on those issues important
to the excluded parties. Even open proceedings can be perceived as
illegitimate if some participants are considered mere bystanders. The
lesson to be learned from the Nine Mile Point TWo case is that there is a
possible adverse effect of nonunanimous settlements on process legitimacy.
D.

The Effect of the Process on Human Relationships

A fourth factor to be considered in evaluating the quality of a dispute
resolution process is its impact on human relationships. An important
societal goal is that members of the society cooperate as much as possible
at individual and group levels.2" 7 As David Luban notes, one criterion
of justice is reconciliation, "transforming the disputants and their mutual
relationships so that they come to acknowledge each other's point of view
and common humanity.""' This transformation is desirable because it

tried to prevent any appearance of commission involvement in 'back room' deals."). The
problem with this approach is that staff, with its technical knowledge, has an important role
to play in negotiations. See Raab, supra note 107, at 197.
285. In re Procedures for Settlement & Stipulation Agreements, Nos. 90-M-0255, 92M-0138, 1992 WL 487888, at *4-5 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 24, 1992).
286. Raab, supra note 107, at 340.
287. Bush, supra note 196, at 916.
288. Luban, supra note 194, at 413.
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can lead to more efficient resource utilization and inspire creative problem
solving.2' 9
Commissions argue that negotiations, even those that lead to

nonunanimous settlements, promote peaceful relations among the parties
and ultimately result in a cooperative resolution of the case. 2" As one
court noted: "The law has no interest in compelling all disputes to be
resolved by litigation. 291 Negotiation, it is argued, can bring public
interest groups with limited resources into a process from which they
might otherwise be excluded. 2" At the bargaining table, parties have
the opportunity to share technical information and to understand each
other's interests "faster than the highly contentious and positional hearings
allow .... "'9' And then the parties and staff can work
together to
294
,
litigation.
of
formality
rigid
the
"without
shape solutions
Commissions assert that traditional rate base regulation is not a
perfect system for resolving complex ratemaking issues. 2' Because the
regulatory process is inherently ambiguous, especially in areas that require
forecasting, proponents of settlement argue that any attempt to arrive at
a single correct solution through' litigation is pointless.2 As the
commission in the Nine Mile Point Two case observed in the context of
a prudence challenge: "[I]t is not possible to quantify directly the cost

289. Bush, supra note 196, at 916.
290. See Attorney Gen. v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 808 P.2d 606, 610
(N.M. 1991); In re Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 52 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 304 (Ohio
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1983); In re El Paso Elec. Co., 101 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 405,
409 (Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1988).
291. Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 613 (Utah
1983).
292. In re Procedures for Settlement & Stipulation Agreements, Nos. 90-M-0255, 92M-0138, 1992 WL 487888, at *2 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 24, 1992).
293. Raab, supra note 107, at 143.
294. Question 2: Dispute Resolution, supra note 115, at 31.
295. See, e.g., In re Nine Mile Point Two Nuclear Generating Facility, 78 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 23, 28 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986); In re New England Tel. & Tel.
Co., 106 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 343, 347 (R.I. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1989). See generally
Morgan, supra note 16, at 71 ("Ambiguity is an inherent characteristic of the ratemaking
process ....The most that can be hoped of any process, whether formal or compromised,
is that the result will fall within a range of reasonableness.").
296. Morgan, supra note 16, at 70-71; Raab, supra note 107, at 92.
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implications of each specific act of imprudence in an extremely complex
construction project that extended over more than a decade." 9 7
Negotiation, on the other hand, gives the parties the opportunity to devise
creative solutions not easily achieved through litigation.29 For instance,
one commentator points approvingly to the creative practicality of the
unanimous settlement of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant case.2" In that
case, the parties agreed to tie the utility's cost recovery directly to the
plant's future performance in order to avoid the necessity of traditional
3
litigation over the prudence of the plant's costs. 00
Despite the benefits of the negotiation process in general, the
nonunanimous settlement procedure has several deficiencies in fostering
cooperative relationships. Such a procedure may discourage the players
from developing collaborative relationships over time. Because
nonunanimous settlement procedures do not require unanimous consent,
participants in the process may be drawn into alliances against each other
and are not encouraged to seek solutions that address the interests of all
the parties . 311 The process may stimulate collaboration between two or
among three of the parties, but other parties may be left out entirely.
Unfortunately, in most commissions the nonunanimous settlement process
has resulted in ongoing utility and commission staff coalitions against
consumer intervenors. 3 2 When a significant segment of ratepayers, such
as captive customers, consistently has the status of nonconsenting party,
cooperation among parties is not enhanced.
It also is questionable whether the nonunanimous settlement process
promotes creative brainstorming and problem-solving. Social scientists
have found that:
297. In re Nine Mile Point Two Nuclear Generating Facility, 78 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 23, 28 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986).
298. In re Procedures for Settlement & Stipulation Agreements, Nos. 90-M-0255, 92M-0138, 1992 WL 487888, at *2 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 24, 1992) (contending
that negotiations may provide the opportunity to address issues that might result in regulatory
innovations); Brock, supra note 105, at 20.
299. Raab, supra note 107, at 137-38.
300. In re Boston Edison, D.P.U. 88-28, 48, 89-100 (Mass. Dept. Pub. Util. Oct.
3, 1989).
301. See supra notes 235-239 and accompanying text. See generally In re Idaho Power
Co., 102 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 139, 148 (Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n 1989) (Miller,
Comm'r, separate opinion) ("[Ilf the future is going to be characterized by consensus rather
than by confrontation, there has to be a genuine effort to obtain consensus from all
interests.").
302. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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Integrative strategies require that group members learn other
members' preferences and find ways to expand the pie of
resources to accommodate these preferences. Encouraging
negotiation groups to reach unanimous decisions may help them
to accomplish these goals by forcing them to consider
nonobvious alternatives that increase the amount of resources
to be divided and the goals of all group members.
Consequently, participants in a unanimous group may be more
committed to the group's final decision, have more control over
the process of reaching agreements, and be more satisfied with
the group's decision.3 3
Without the unanimity requirement, the parties in a commission settlement
negotiation may not feel pressure to approach the issues creatively.
Rather, they may merely seek to develop alliances, especially with
commission staff, in order to gain quick approval by the commission. The
Trimble County," 4 Nine Mile Point Two,3 5 and Edison cases 3" all
support this hypothesis. In all three cases, without the constraints of a
unanimity rule, the utility did not feel compelled to work with consumer
groups to develop creative solutions, but rather primarily sought to reach
agreements with commission staff, to the detriment of consumer
intervenors.
E.

The Effect of the Process on Clarifying Fundamental Policy Issues

A final factor that should be evaluated in considering the propriety
of the nonunanimous settlement process is the impact of that process on
clarifying fundamental policy issues. Public hearings and decisions on
fundamental policy issues are valuable to society. They help guide our
behavior on matters of public concern. 3 7 As Judge Harry Edwards
observed: "One essential function of the law is to reflect the public

303. Thompson et al., supra note 209, at 87. See generally Raab, supra note 107, at
142 ("Parties needed the opportunity to present their own and probe each other's cases. This
ventilating was probably necessary to get numerous facts and opinions on the table and to
allow the parties to more realistically assess their relative strengths in the cases.").
304. See supra notes 134-143 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 277-284 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 243-251 and accompanying text.
307. See generally Blackburn, supra note 4, at 571.
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resolution of ... irreconcilable differences [in disputes about fundamental
public values]; lawmakers are forced to choose among these differing
visions of the public good." 3" 8 Public airing of disputes clarifies for the
disputants, and society as a whole, the conflicting moral and philosophical
values at stake in a particular case. Some problems are not just about
interpersonal disputes or failures to communicate, but are instead about
basic disagreements about society's direction. 3" Formal adjudicatory
proceedings do not attempt to avoid these controversies. They provide a
public forum for these debates.3"0 Finally, public pronouncements on
fundamental policies help make officials and agencies politically
accountable. When officials make public decisions on these difficult
issues, those affected may have some recourse through the democratic
process.311
For these reasons, most commentators have recognized that disputes
about fundamental policies are poor candidates for ADR processes.312
In his seminal article, Against Settlement, 3 Owen Fiss notes:
Adjudication uses public resources and employs not strangers
chosen by the parties but public officials chosen by a process
in which the public participates. These officials, like members
of the legislative and executive branches, possess a power that

308. Edwards, supra note 194, at 678-79; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and
Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 26 ("Resolving disputes is only
one of the two principal functions of the legal system. The other is shaping legal rules to
use in the future. . . . If every case were settled, there would be no ongoing process of
elucidation.").
309. See generally AMY, supra note 194, at 172-187 (noting that conflicts may be
about fundamental principles or conceptions of society and, consequently, not amenable to
negotiation).
310. See generally Delgado et al., supra note 194, at 1394 (pointing out that
informalism ignores conflicts about basic social tensions); Edwards, supra note 194, at 678
(noting that settlement techniques may never be able to reconcile disputes about fundamental
public values).
311. Edwards, supra note 194, at 677 ("[e]nvironmental mediation and negotiation
present the danger that environmental standards will be set by private groups without the

democratic checks of governmental institutions"). See generally Rosin, supra note 216, at
372-73 (noting that settlements make it difficult for public to monitor agency conduct).
312. Raab, supra note 107, at 54-55. See generally AMY, supra note 194, at 172-76
(noting that mediation can distort environmental conflict); Amy, supra note 13, at 15-16
(observing, in the context of environmental mediation, that mediation of controversies over
nuclear power plants is inappropriate).
313. Fiss, supra note 194.
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has been defined and conferred by public law, not by private
agreement. Their job is not to maximize the ends of private
parties, not simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and
give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as
the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to
bring reality into accord with them."'
The danger with ADR is that it can replace the rule of law on basic policy
issues with privately bargained-for deals.3" 5 Even fervent supporters of
ADR acknowledge that certain disputes involving questions of fundamental
rights should be decided through formal dispute resolution
mechanisms.316
In the public utility context, not all ratemaking issues concern
fundamental public values. Issues such as the setting of the utility's
allowed rate of return or the allowance or disallowance of minor operating
expenses are not generally questions that call for official elucidation.3 7
They usually raise technical issues with few policy implications. On the
other hand, questions relating to the methodologies for the treatment of
imprudent construction costs of new plants, the performance standards for
new plants, and the allocation of costs between captive customers of a
utility and customers who have market alternatives are controversial issues
that generally require public debate and official decision.3"' These are
issues which have a major impact on both the utilities and ratepayers.
They either address significant issues of future rate increases or of cost

314. Id. at 1085.
315. See Edwards, supra note 194, at 676-77; David Schoenbrod, Limits and Dangers
of Environmental Mediation: A Review Essay, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1453, 1466 (1983)
(reviewing ALLAN TALBOT, SETTLING THINGS (1983)).
316. See Raab, supra note 107, at 54-55.
317. See Harter, supra note 194, at 1411 ("No one would seriously contend that a
disagreement over how much postage should be placed on a package should be made by
means of a trial.").
318. Cf. Daniel Joseph & Michelle L. Gilbert, Breaking the Settlement Ice: The Use
of Settlement Judges in Administrative Proceedings, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 571,590-91 (1989-1990)
(discussing 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3(D)(11) (1993) and recommending that "[s]ettlement
procedures may not be appropriate for decisions on some matters involving major policy
issues"). See generally Raab, supra note 107, at 55-56 (observing that ADR may be
inadvisable for extremely controversial cases or where there is need for public illumination
on details of public utility's actions or proposals).
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allocation among different customer classes. Without such determinations,
utilities have little direction for long-term planning, and ratepayers have
little guidance as to the amounts of future rate increases.
The nonunanimous settlement mechanism has the potential for
permitting settlements under circumstances in which they are
inappropriate. By definition, the more controversial a case, the more
difficult it will be to reach agreement among all parties. Indeed, one study
has shown that collaborative dispute resolution on utility issues is much
more successful on smaller technical issues than on larger policy
matters.319 The failure to obtain unanimity on a policy issue may not
reflect unreasonable intransigence on the part of non-settling parties, but
instead may show that the issue should be resolved through the formal
hearing process rather than through the settlement process. As an Ohio
commissioner observed in a dissent from a decision that approved a
nonunanimous settlement stipulating nuclear plant performance standards:
Unfortunately, the more complex the policy consideration, the
less likely a consensus position is to produce policy coherence
in all areas. In this case, the Commission clearly needs to
establish plant performance standards which promote economic
efficiency, which assess penalties when standards are not
achieved, [which] reward[] when they are exceeded, and most
importantly, which promote[] safe operation of plants.
The Stipulation [however] establishes nuclear performance
standards which supersede any other such standards that may
be adopted by the Commission during the time that the
Stipulation is in effect.320
Commissions should be wary of using nonunanimous settlements to
avoid hard decisions that might in the long run be beneficial to the
regulatory process and the public at large, especially as significant
deregulation begins. The utilities, large customers, and captive ratepayers
should receive clear signals from commissions in regard to the

319. See Raab, supra note 107, at 204.
320. In re Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 99 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 407, 461
(Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n 1989).
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commissions' policies. Without such direction, participants will be unable
to plan reasonably for the future. Nonunanimous settlements, therefore,
should not be used to avoid hard decisions.
V.

Safeguards Against the Dangers of Nonunanimous Settlements

As this discussion shows, significant problems exist with the
nonunanimous settlement process for resolving rate cases. While this
process is more efficient than traditional rate adjudication and the
unanimous settlement process, it raises serious questions concerning the
furtherance of social justice, the legitimacy of the process, the
advancement of human relationships, and the protection of fundamental
rights. Commissions have attempted to address some of these problems
by adopting certain procedures and standards for review of nonunanimous
settlements. Most commissions require an independent assessment to
determine whether the settlement is in the public interest. Others require
that substantial evidence support the settlement. Certain commissions
compare the settlement with the possible outcome of the case if it had
been litigated. Some commissions evaluate the reasonableness of the
negotiation process itself. Finally, some examine the range of interests
represented by the parties who signed the agreement. In this part, the
Article will evaluate how well each of these procedures addresses the
problems raised by the nonunanimous settlement process.
A.

Independent Assessment by the Commission to Determine ifthe
Settlement is in the Public Interest

Before approving a nonunanimous settlement, most commissions
require an independent assessment of the agreement to determine if it is
in the public interest.3 2' Commissions emphasize that settlements are not
binding upon them and that they, not the parties to the case, have the

321. See, e.g., In re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 81 Pub Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 587,
597 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1987); In re Rules of Practice & Procedure Before the
Comm'n, 112 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 215, 229 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1990); In
re Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 99 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 407, 450 (Ohio Pub.
Util. Comm'n 1989); In re El Paso Elec. Co., 101 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)'405, 409
(Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n).
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ultimate responsibility to determine the validity of a rate order.322
Commissions analogize the situation to the approval of settlements in class
action cases, where "the details of a resolution can probably best be
understood and worked out by the parties themselves, but the court must
assure that the public interest . . . does not go unrecognized." 323
Although this approach is well-intentioned, its major flaw is the
amorphous nature of the public interest standard. In another context,
Owen Fiss observes that the Tunney Act,3 24 which allows a court to
approve an antitrust settlement proposed by the Department of Justice if
it is in the public interest, "provides the judge with virtually no guidance
in making this determination or in deciding whether to approve the
settlement. The public-interest standard in fact seems to invite the
consideration of such nonjudicial factors as popular sentiment and the
efficient allocation of prosecutorial resources."325
In fact, in applying the public interest standard to approve
nonunanimous settlements, some commissions have been prone to consider
factors having little relation to the reasonableness of the rates. For
example, one commission noted that "it does not serve the public interest
for this Commission to continue to review past mistakes and postures [of
the utility]; it is in the public interest that this Commission and the
Company's management both focus on the future ...
"326 This same
commission found that a settlement was in the public interest because it
avoided the risk of an adverse ruling from the state supreme court.
Another commission concluded that it was not in the public interest to
require a cost-of-service study or an expanded-load research program
before its approval of a settlement because the studies requested were too
complex and would delay the proceeding.327 Still another commission

322. See, e.g., In re Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 348,
352 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989); In re Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 99 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 407, 417 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n 1989).
323. Morgan, supra note 16, at 74; see also In re San Diego Gas & Elec. Co.,
Decision No. 92-12-019, Application No. 91-11-024 1.92-02-004, 1992 WL 465296, at *1
(Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Dec. 3, 1992).
324. Antitrust Procedures & Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1988).
325. Fiss, supra note ,194, at 1081.
326. In re Idaho Power Co., 102 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 139, 146 (Idaho Pub.
Util. Comm'n 1989).
327. In re Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 130, 146
(Iowa Commerce Comm'n 1982).
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found that a settlement was in the public interest because the benefits to
ratepayers under the agreement were substantially equivalent to those that
would be reaped if the utility filed for a threatened additional rate
3 28
increase.
Contrary to the suggestion by some commissions that the public
interest standard is equivalent to the just and reasonable criteria in
traditional rate base ratemaking,3 29 the two are quite different. As
described previously, the traditional standard requires an examination of
each element of a utility's revenue requirement-the rate base, rate of
return, and operating expenses-and then a separate consideration of the
reasonableness of rate allocation among customer classes.330 In contrast,
the public interest standard is merely a rough appraisal as to whether the
settlement "strikes a fair balance among the interests of ratepayers and
investors . . . . ""' Instead of looking at each of the variables in the
ratemaking formula, the commission need only consider whether the
agreement, as an integrated whole, is fair or whether it comports with
some vague notion of regulatory policy.332
The Nine Mile Point Two rate case reflects the distinction between
these two approaches.333 The nonconsenting parties to the agreement,
the consumer intervenors, asserted that the New York Public Service
Commission had to determine the prudence of the utility's actions during
the construction of the plant in order to decide the just and reasonable rate
base. The majority summarily rejected this argument and implicitly
suggested that the just and reasonable standard is equivalent to a public
interest test.3" The majority, however, failed to recognize that the

328. In re Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 348, 359 (Ky.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989).
329. See In re Nine Mile Point Two Nuclear Generating Facility, 78 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 23, 43-44 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986).
330. See supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
331. In re Procedures for Settlement & Stipulation Agreements, Nos. 90-M-0255, 92M-0138, 1992 WL 487888, at *13 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 24, 1992).
332. See id. at 12-13; Business & Professional People for Pub. Interest v. Illinois
Commerce Comm'n, 555 N.E.2d 693, 702 (Ill. 1989) (rejecting a nonunanimous settlement
because commission looked at decision as an "integrated whole," and did not decide each
issue on the merits).
333. In re Nine Mile Point Two Nuclear Generating Facility, 78 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 23 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986); see supra notes 277-284 and accompanying text.
334. In re Nine Mile Point Two Nuclear Generating Facility, 78 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 23, 43-44 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986).
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expression "just and reasonable" is a term of art in traditional ratemaking,
not just a general statement of policy. As the dissent pointed out, the
determination of justness and reasonableness required the consideration
of two key issues: the value of the enhancements to the plant and the
reasonableness of the construction delays. A prudence review was
essential to such a determination. 3 s
An independent assessment under a public interest standard provides
little protection against abuses of the nonunanimous settlement process.
While some commissions use the public interest standard to engage in a
serious review of ratemaking issues,33 6 others unfortunately do not. The
latter commissions balance the interests in any way they see fit. Motivated
by concerns of delay and risk aversion, some commissions simply approve
the settlement.33 7 Therefore, the independent assessment mechanism
provides limited protection against imbalances of power or unfair
commission staff-utility alliances in the negotiation process of
nonunanimous settlements. Nor does the assessment place limits on the
commission's authority to approve such agreements and to avoid decisions
on significant policy issues. Quite simply, the independent assessment
mechanism can permit a commission to clothe an unprincipled decision
in the ostensibly acceptable attire of the public interest.
B.

Fact-FindingHearings to Determine if the Settlement is Supported
by Substantial Evidence

Some commissions require a fact-finding hearing to determine if
substantial evidence supports a nonunanimous settlement.3 These
hearings are not full-blown rate case hearings but rather are flexible

335. Id. at 52.
336. See, e.g., In re Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 99 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
407 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n 1989).
337. See supranotes 326-328 and accompanying text. See generally Rosin, supra note
216, at 368.
338. See, e.g., Business & Professional People for Pub. Interest v. Illinois Commerce
Comm'n, 555 N.E.2d 693, 704 (I11.1989); In re Public Serv. Co., 72 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 660, 684-87 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986); In re Rules of Practice & Procedure
Before the Comm'n, 112 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 215, 218-19 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1990). But see In re Idaho Power Co., 102 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 139 (Idaho Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1989) (rejecting hearing requirement).
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hearings to determine the propriety of the settled rates."' Like the
problems with the independent assessment process, this procedure fails
to provide adequate protection against the dangers of nonunanimous
settlements. If the commission does not have precise standards for
evaluating the reasonableness of its decisions, a fact-finding hearing does
little to prevent the commission from abusing its discretion. The phrase
"substantial evidence" only has meaning if the commissions evaluate the
substantiality of the evidence under a specific standard.
Without the requirements that the parties present evidence on each
variable of the traditional ratemaking formula and that the commission
make findings of fact on each of those variables, fact-finding hearings on
nonunanimous settlements can become simply the presentation of canned
testimony in favor of the settlement. 3"° The predisposition of
commissions to favor settlements as a means of conserving resources and
expediting cases can give rise to window-dressing hearings in which the
outcome is essentially predetermined. As the reviewing court in the LG&E
case observed: "[The] entire proceeding before [the commission]
regarding the settlement agreement can be considered nothing more than
the most summary of proceedings with witnesses for LG&E and the
[commission] staff cheer-leading in favor of the agreement." 341 In one
Texas Commission case, the attorney for one of the agreement's
supporters even acknowledged on the record that accounting data had been
34 2
fabricated for the purpose of justifying the settlement.
Allowing opposing parties to cross-examine witnesses for the
signatories and to present evidence in opposition to the agreement does

339. See supra notes 182-183 and accompanying text.
340. See generally Rhode Island Consumers' Council v. Federal Power Comm'n, 504
F.2d 203, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (warning in federal context against pro forma hearings).
341. Kentucky ex rel. Cowan v. Kentucky Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 120 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 168, 173 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991); see also United States v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
465 A.2d 829, 834 (D.C. 1983) (Terry, J.,concurring) ("In my judgment the procedure
by which a settlement was imposed in this case on an unwilling [intervenor] reeked of
unfairness. The Commission's decision to limit [the intervenor] to the presentation of one
witness, in particular, strikes me as arbitrary and capricious .... ).
342. In re Gulf States Util. Co. (Nos. 8702 et seq.) Transcript of proceedings at 160
(Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n) (One of settling parties acknowledges that "there has been some
talk about these numbers being fill numbers or backed-into numbers. Of course, a lot of them
are backed into. Let's not kid anybody on that.").
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little to make these hearings more fair. While commissions profess to
place the burden of proof on those favoring the settlement,343 such
declarations are not helpful without a substantive standard for decisionmaking. 3" Some commissions would rather approve agreements than
face lengthy hearings and may saddle opponents with the burden of
showing the unreasonableness of the agreement.345 This procedure does
little to rectify the possible power imbalances between utilities and captive

ratepayer intervenors that result from the nonunanimous settlement
process. Further, this procedure does not contribute to the perception of

a legitimate decision-making process.
C.

Comparison of the Settlement with the Possible Outcome

Some commissions compare the nonunanimous settlement agreement
with the possible outcome of litigation to evaluate the reasonableness of
the nonunanimous settlement. 3 For example, the New York settlement
guidelines provide that one of the factors to be considered in reviewing

343. See, e.g., In re Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 348,
358 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989); In re Procedures for Settlement & Stipulation
Agreements, Nos. 90-M-0255, 92-M-0138, 1992 WL 487888, at *18 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Mar. 24, 1992) ("The burden of proving that a proposed settlement is in the public
interest rests on the parties proposing the settlement.").
344. See City of Abilene v. Public Util. Comm'n, 854 S.W.2d 932, 938-39 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1993) ("There is a danger that when presented with a ready-made solution, the
Commission might unconsciously require that the opponents refute the agreement, rather
than require the utility to prove affirmatively that the proposed rates are just and
reasonable.").
345. Kentucky ex rel. Cowan v. Kentucky Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 120 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 168, 173-74 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991). See generally Morgan, supra note 16, at 76
(discussing that a federal Administrative Conference recommends that objectors be allowed
to present objections to nonunanimous settlements and noting that "[tihe hearing under such
circumstances may seem to be less than wholly objective; [the objector] seems in effect
forced to prove the others wrong. Assuming the agency has the data well in hand and has
previously resolved many of the underlying policies, however, the actual detriment to the
objector is relatively slight, while the benefit to the expeditious flow of cases through the
agency seems significant indeed.").
346. See, e.g., In re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 81 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 587,
604-05 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1987); In re Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 107 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 348, 359 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989); In re Procedures for Settlement
& Stipulation Agreements, Nos. 90-M-0255, 92-M-0138, 1992 WL 487888, at *12 (N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 24, 1992).
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a settlement is "whether the result compares favorably with the likely
result of full litigation and is within the range of reasonable
outcomes." 347 If the parties reach a settlement before they develop a full
record in a case, the commission holds mini-hearings on the settlement
during which supporters of the agreement present testimony predicting the
outcome of a fully-litigated case and contrasting those projections with the
settlement amounts. Opponents can then attempt to contest these
predictions.
Like the other two methods for reviewing nonunanimous settlements,
this method is subject to abuse. As Owen Fiss observes in his critique of
the comparison with judgment approach for evaluating class action
settlements under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
[T]he judgment being used as a measure of settlement is very
odd indeed: It has never in fact been entered, but only
imagined. It has been constructed without benefit of a full trial,
and at a time when the judge can no longer count on a thorough
presentation promised by the adversary system. The contending
parties have struck a bargain, and have every interest in
defending the settlement and convincing the judge that it is in
accord with the law.34
In the nonunanimous settlement context, commissions have to face the
opponents to the agreement. But, given the summary nature of the
approval hearings, the lack of standards for reviewing evidence, and the
usual alliance between staff and the utility, opponents frequently have a
difficult time persuading the commission that the settlement agreement is
not within the range of possible outcomes. As long as the supporters of
the agreement present some credible basis for their predictions, the
commission is likely to give its approval. 4

347. In re Procedures for Settlement & Stipulation Agreements, Nos. 90-M-0255, 92M-0138, 1992 WL 487888, at *12 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 24, 1992).
348. Fiss, supra note 194, at 1082.
349. See, e.g., In re Nine Mile Point Two Nuclear Generating Facility, 78 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 23, 30-31 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986). In that case, concerning rate
base allowances or disallowances for the Nine Mile Point Two nuclear generating plant,
supporters of the settlement compared the allowances for the Shoreham plant, which resulted
from a previous fully-litigated proceeding. While the Commission accepted this comparison,
the dissenters observed that, "[t]o use the Shoreham disallowance as the basis for the Nine
Mile Point Two disallowance is to base a decision on the shadow of a shadow." Id. at 54.
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D. Examination of the Reasonableness of the Negotiation Process
A few commissions also examine the reasonableness. of the

negotiation process itself to determine whether to approve a nonunanimous
settlement.35 They consider whether any parties have been excluded
from settlement discussions, whether any parties were precluded from

participating in the drafting of the agreement, and whether the negotiation
process was tainted with any irregularities.3"5' If the commission
concludes that the parties conducted the negotiations at arm's-length and

in good faith, the commission can approve the settlement.352 For
example, in the LG&E case, the Kentucky Public Service Commission
approved the settlement after reviewing affidavits and reply affidavits
describing the bargaining process. It found that all the parties had the
opportunity to participate in negotiations, that the conduct of the
discussions was proper and regular, and that the intervenors opposing the
deal had taken unreasonable positions in these discussions."'
The examination of the negotiations, however, may inhibit the very
kind of open and informal exchanges that are helpful in facilitating
negotiation. Indeed, some commissions address this problem by adopting
confidentiality rules prohibiting disclosure of the substance of settlement
discussions without the consent of all parties.354 In adopting such a rule,

the California Public Utilities Commission stated that its "intent was to

350. See e.g., In re Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 348,
354-56 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989); In re Rules of Practice & Procedure Before the
Comm'n, 112 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 215, 229 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1990).
351. In re Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 348, 354-56
(Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989); cf In re Procedures for Settlement & Stipulation
Agreements, Nos. 90-M-0255, 92-M-0138, 1992 WL 487888, at *6 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Mar. 24, 1992) (prohibiting caucuses between utility and non-utility parties without
notice because private meetings between such parties fail to give the impression of an open
process).
352. In re Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 348, 356 (Ky.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989).
353. See id. at 354-56.
354. See, e.g., In re Commission's Rules of Practice & Procedure, 29 CPUC 2d 392,
Rule 51.9 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Sept. 28, 1988) (Nos. 88-09-060, 84-12-028) ("No
discussion, admission, concession or offer to stipulate or settle, whether oral or written,
made during any negotiation on a stipulation or settlement shall be subject to discovery, or
admissible in any evidentiary hearing against any participant who objects to its admission.");
In re Procedures for Settlement & Stipulation Agreements, Nos. 90-M-0255, 92-M-0138,
1992 WL 487888, at *19 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 24, 1992).
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create a forum where free and open discussions could take place during
the settlement discussions themselves."3 55 Without such protection,
parties may refrain from the kind of free-wheeling discussions that lead
to creative solutions to problems. Their goal may merely be to make a
record of their purported good faith efforts to negotiate. 56
This approach also suffers from a lack of standards. Commissions
simply have not developed, and would be hard pressed to develop,
workable criteria for reviewing the reasonableness of the negotiation
process itself. The fact that intervenors have an opportunity to participate
in settlement negotiations does not, by itself, indicate that the utility and
staff negotiated in good faith. Any party can go through the motions of
bargaining without any intention of budging from its original position.
Likewise, given the informal nature of the negotiation process, it is a
difficult task for a commission to distinguish between a party's posturing
in negotiations and its actual position on a particular issue. It is odd for
commissions to accept settlement as a means to avoid the rigorous
requirements of traditional regulation while they embrace the additional
obligation of reviewing affidavits and counter-affidavits from participants
to evaluate the reasonableness of the bargaining process itself.
E.

The Range of Interests Supporting the Settlement

In assessing the propriety of a nonunanimous settlement, some
commissions consider the range of interests held by the parties that

355. In re Commission Rule of Practice & Procedure, No. 88-09-060, at *35 (Cal.
Pub. Util. Comm'n Sept. 28, 1988) (Westlaw, PUR Database).
356. In In re Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 348 (Ky.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989), the commission rejected the argument that a review of the
reasonableness of the negotiation process violated the prohibition against admitting evidence
of settlement offers in a trial. The commission reasoned that this prohibition
is based on the reasoning that "the law favors settlement of controversies out
of court, and will not permit an offer of compromise to be used as a weapon
against the party making the offer." . ..That reasoning, however, has no
application to the determination of the issue of whether the proceeding leading
to the Settlement Agreement is tainted. This issue addresses not a trial of the
merits of the Settlement Agreement, but rather the conduct leading up to that
Agreement.
Id. at 353. This argument, however, misses the point. The policy preventing use of
settlement offers as a weapon against another party is itself based on the belief that such use
would inhibit free and open negotiations among the parties. Whether evidence of settlement
offers is admitted on the merits of the case or for a review of the reasonableness of the
negotiations, its admission has a chilling effect on settlement discussions.
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support the settlement.357 If a broad spectrum of intervenor interests
supports the agreement or if traditionally adversarial parties are signatories
to the agreement, these commissions will give the nonunanimous
settlement careful consideration. The concern is the legitimacy of the
settlement process. As the New York Public Service Commission observed
in adopting settlement guidelines: "To avoid any appearance of
impropriety in settlements, every effort must be made to ensure that
potentially interested parties have an adequate opportunity to participate
in negotiations. 35 8 To provide an incentive for such participation,
commissions notify the parties that the commission will consider the
breadth of interests represented by signatory parties. Through this
inclusionary process, commissions hope to address the problems of power
imbalance inherent in nonunanimous settlements.
This approach, however, does not completely remedy those
problems. While the New York Public Service Commission's approach
commendably recognizes the need to include as many parties as possible
in the agreement, it provides little protection for representatives of captive
ratepayers. Given the variety of interests represented in major rate cases,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to develop a workable definition of the
term "range of interests." For example, if all industrial and commercial
intervenors, as well as the commission's staff, support the agreement, a
commission may find that the participation criterion is satisfied. Similarly,
if most residential and governmental intervenors are signatories, but lowincome customers oppose the agreement, a commission also may
reasonably conclude that a broad spectrum of the interests are included.
Like the phrase "public interest," the phrase "range of interest" is
subject to ad hoc interpretations. When the Michigan Public Service
Commission recently approved a nonunanimous settlement, it suggested

357. See, e.g., In re Rules of Practice & Procedure Before the Comm'n, 112 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 215, 229 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1990); In re Detroit Edison Co.,
39 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 107, 111 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1980); In re Procedures
for Settlement & Stipulation Agreements, Nos. 90-M-0255, 92-M-0138, 1992 WL 487888,
at *19 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 24, 1992); In re Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co.,
99 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 407, 417, 449 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n 1989). But see In
re Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 348, 352 (Ky. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1989).
358. In re Procedures for Settlement & Stipulation Agreements, Nos. 90-M-0255, 92M-0138, 1992 WL 487888, at *4 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 24 1992).
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that the commission staff itself can represent a range of interests because
the staff's role "is to promote the public interest, including the interests
of ratepayers." 359 Given this vague notion of the range of interests, some
commissions may conclude that a broad range of interests is represented
simply to avoid the delay caused by disapproval of nonunanimous
settlements.
The large number of issues raised in rate cases compounds this
problem. When negotiation involves two or more issues, "majority rule
is subject to numerous methods of strategic manipulation and paradoxes
of voting," the result of which may not reflect the optimal outcome
desired by the consenting parties." In rate cases, some parties may
have aligning interests on some issues, but conflicting interests on
others.36 ' For instance, industrial intervenors may agree with residential
groups on disallowances for certain utility expenditures, but may differ
with regard to the methods of allocating rates among customer classes.
Disagreements may even arise within the same customer class. Moreover,
each party may assign different weights and priorities to a particular issue.
The fact that a range of intervenors supports a nonunanimous settlement
does not necessarily mean that those intervenors represent a wide spectrum
of positions on all issues in the case.
Assent to the nonunanimous settlement by the Office of Public
Counsel or another proxy advocate does not alleviate these definitional
problems.362 Although such advocates are charged with the task of
intervening on behalf of large numbers of ratepayers, the advocate cannot
practically represent all of those consumers' conflicting interests. As one
judge noted in an appeal from a case in which the utility's largest
customer opposed a nonunanimous settlement entered into with the District
of Columbia's Office of People's Counsel: "I seriously doubt whether the

359. In re Midland Cogeneration Venture Ltd. Partnership, 141 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 127, 159 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1993).
360. Thompson et al., supra note 209, at 87.
361. See supra notes 235-236 and accompanying text.
362. See In re Public Serv. Co., 72 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 660, 685 (Ind. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1986) (noting that when proxy advocate participates in drafting proposed
settlement agreement, commission has responsibility to scrutinize merits of agreement more
carefully).
One commentator has suggested that the proxy advocate should be the chief negotiator
for the various consumer concerns. Katko, supra note 126, at 1335-37. He does not,
however, address the issue of possible conflicting concerns of consumer groups.
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Office of People's Counsel, which purports to represent all consumers in
the District of Columbia, can ever adequately represent the interests of
[that customer] which are likely to be at odds with the interests of its other
'clients.'"363 In a similar vein, a dissenting commissioner lamented the
fact that although the state's attorney general and most other intervenors
agreed to a nonunanimous settlement, they failed to address issues raised
by a community organization. He observed that "[t]he lesson to be learned
is that if the future is going to be characterized by consensus rather than
by confrontation, there has to be a genuine effort to obtain consensus from
all interests. '3"4
VI. The Unanimity Rule for Settlement of Rate Cases
As the above analysis indicates, there are significant questions
regarding whether public utility commission enabling acts authorize
nonunanimous settlements of rate cases. Regardless of the issue of
statutory authority, serious policy questions exist as to the propriety of
the process. Finally, although laudable, commission efforts to remedy
these problems through independent assessments of nonunanimous
settlements are not completely effective. These independent assessments
are seemingly standardless, providing little protection to weak parties,
such as captive ratepayers.
A.

Advantages of a Unanimity Rule

A rule requiring unanimity before commission approval of
settlements addresses many of these problems by helping to maintain the
balance of power in negotiation. Because all parties, not just the utility,
have veto power, consumer groups may use the threat of formal hearings
as a bargaining weapon. Utilities cannot avoid negotiating in the shadow
of the law simply by forming alliances with some parties against
others.365

363. United States v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 465 A.2d 829, 834 n.1 (D.C. 1983)
(Terry, J., concurring).
364. In re Idaho Power Co., 102 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 139, 148 (Idaho Pub.
Util. Comm'n 1989) (Miller, Comm'r, separate opinion).
365. See supra notes 235-239 and accompanying text.
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Because all parties have more or less an equal role in the negotiation
process, the public perceives the process as legitimate." A unanimity
rule will also promote commission decisions on fundamental public
issues.367 Although all participants to a proceeding can consent to an
agreement on public issues, unanimity increases the likelihood that a
commission will render a formal determination on an issue when a
significant segment of the public desires it. Finally, unanimous consent
encourages parties to develop creative, nonobvious solutions for the issues
in a case.3 68 As a result, a unanimity rule may actually increase
participation in the bargaining process in the long term.169
Admittedly, the formal adjudicatory process has significant
limitations. The process neither encourages innovative solutions to longterm policy issues nor fosters cooperative relationships among the parties.
It may also have the tendency to become bogged down in protracted
disputes. A unanimity rule, however, affords the benefits of ADR without
jeopardizing the rights of any of the parties.
The contrast between the use of unanimity and nonunanimity rules
is starkly illustrated by the two rounds of negotiations in the Edison
cases.37 In the first round, the utility entered into a nonunanimous
settlement with several governmental parties. Edison presented the
agreement to consumer intervenors as a fait accompli. As an Edison vice
president put it: "The agreement is not negotiable; that's the way it was
put together. That doesn't mean we won't talk to people, and have, but
changing the terms of the agreement, no. We've given our absolute best
on this agreement now and we just can't change it." 37
"' When consumer
intervenors pushed for negotiations, Edison did not budge. The Illinois
Commerce Commission, in its desire to approve the settlement, held
hearings on the agreement seven days a week, often starting at eight a.m.
and ending at two a.m. the next morning.372 The attorney for one

366. See supra notes 261-268 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 312-320 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 290-306 and accompanying text.
369. See Thompson et al., supra note 209, at 87.
370. See supra notes 243-251 and accompanying text.
371. Mark Eissman, Edison Won't Negotiate on its Rate Plan, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 25,
1986, at 1.
372. McHugh, supra note 249, at 16.
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consumer intervenor commented that the agreement "was supposed to be
a done political deal . . . Edison, with the support of the hearing
examiner, was trying to drive us into the ground. '' 373 When the
Commission rejected this settlement by a four to three vote, Edison allied
with the Commission staff and entered into a new nonunanimous
settlement for a $480 million rate increase.3 74 The Commission held
another "around the clock proceeding" and eventually approved the
settlement.375
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the Commission's decision,
holding that the Commission's enabling statute did not authorize
nonunanimous settlements. 376 Thereafter, the second round of
negotiations took place, under the court's requirement of a unanimity rule.
During these negotiations, Edison did not approach consumer intervenors
with a "done deal," but recognized the balance of power. Edison's
attorney observed:
As these cases went on, there were times when the consumer
. . . parties might have thought they had the upper hand...
And then there were times . . . when Edison might have
thought it had the upper hand. But, no one consistently had the
upper hand. It seemed like there ought to be a way, to use
377
somewhat of a cliche, 'to cut through the Gordian knot.
Initiated by Edison's president, the bargaining took place over several
months, with numerous confidential settlement conferences among all the
parties with "hard bargaining on an almost daily basis." 3 7' Negotiated
line-by-line, word-by-word, settlement papers were "extensively edited
and marked up by all the attorneys. 3 79 The final agreement settled six
large rate cases.380

373. Id.
374. Id. at 17.
375. Id.
376. Business & Professional People for Pub. Interest v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n,
555 N.E.2d 693 (Ill. 1990).
377. McHugh, supra note 249, at 20 (quoting Dale E. Thomas, attorney for Edison).
378. Id. at 22.
379. Id. (quoting Howard A. Learner, litigant for consumers' group).
380. Id. at 15.
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Regardless of the merits of the settlement agreements, the two rounds
of negotiations clearly illustrate the difference between negotiations under
a unanimity and under a nonunanimity rule. The nonunanimous settlement
process substantially favored the utility. Edison forged alliances with
governmental parties and presented the settlement to the other parties on
a take-it or leave-it basis. To gain Commission approval, Edison allied
with the Commission staff. To expedite the case, the Commission held
accelerated hearings. Then, in reviewing this settlement, the Commission
failed to use the traditional ratemaking standards, but applied a vague
balancing test, considering the agreement as an integrated whole.3"'
Negotiations under a unanimity rule, however, reflected a more
legitimate process. Edison approached consumer intervenors as equal
partners in the discussions. Settlement provisions were negotiated issue
by issue. Collaboration was encouraged. Even with the large number of
involved parties and the variety of interests represented,3 82 the parties
reached a final resolution.
A unanimity rule clearly has the drawbacks of expanding the time
devoted to negotiations and increasing the probability of group
impasse.38 3 Expeditious processing of cases, however, cannot be a goal
unto itself. The legitimacy of the decision-making process and the final
result is a vital factor that should be considered in evaluating the success
of any dispute resolution mechanism. Most studies of administrative ADR
show that negotiation is not a panacea for all problems of the adjudicatory
system. Indeed, administrative ADR has been found to be a successful
process for dispute resolution only in a limited number of such cases.384
When there are multiple parties and issues, and when some of those issues
concern fundamental values or beliefs, informal settlement of a dispute

381. Business & Professional People for Pub. Interest v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n,
555 N.E.2d 693, 702 (II1. 1990).
382. McHugh, supra note 249.
383. See generally Thompson et al., supra note 209, at 92.
384. See generally AMY, supra note 194, at 215 (noting that mediation tends to work
only in certain circumstances); Stewart, supra note 122, at 677 (observing that prospects
for negotiated litigation alternatives are greater in certain types of cases); Susskind &
McMahon, supra note 194, at 152-53 (concluding that parties will not participate in
negotiations if their alternatives elsewhere will produce better results).
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may be impossible."' 5 Even if possible, settlement may require
expenditures equivalent in time and resources to those in traditional formal
processes.38 6 In other words, there is no quick fix to the problems of
delay in public utility rate cases.
B.

The Problem of the Intransigent Intervenor

The difficulty of the intransigent intervenor does not warrant the
abandonment of a unanimity rule. As described above, some commissions
reject a requirement of unanimous consent because they assume that
inactive or uncooperative parties would have the ability to block any
possible settlement. They fear that the consumer groups will unreasonably
hold out solely for their own political purposes. 8 7 The problem with
this argument is the assumption that a party's intransigence necessarily
reflects unreasonable behavior. A consumer group may choose not to
agree to a nonunanimous settlement because the group adheres to certain
fundamental beliefs about a particular issue, because it feels that a public
hearing would help to build collective action on an issue, or because it
believes that a formal pronouncement of policy by the commission is
necessary. None of these motives are per se unreasonable and they should
not be grounds for abandoning a unanimity requirement. Intransigent
utilities are not treated in this manner. When Edison presented its
nonunanimous settlement to consumer intervenors and refused to negotiate
its terms, 8 8 the Commission did not propose a process which would
permit the staff and other intervenors to reach a nonunanimous settlement
to the exclusion of the utility.

385. See generally Stewart, supra note 122, at 677 n.81 (quoting an estimate that only
ten percent of environmental controversies can be successfully negotiated); Susskind, supra
note 13, at 152 (Commenting on the EPA's experience with negotiated rulemaking, the
author observes that "parties are unlikely to make the necessary concessions to reach
consensus ifthe only way to reach agreement is to compromise fundamental values or
beliefs.").
386. Raab, supra note 107, at 133-34 (concluding that the settlement of the Pilgrim
generating plant case in Massachusetts could not be credited with significant resource
savings).
387. See supra text accompanying notes 122-123.
388. See supra text accompanying note 371.
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Even if a party is intransigent and a full settlement cannot be
reached, the process of negotiation itself may aid the eventual resolution
of the dispute. As one commentator observed in regard to negotiated
rulemaking in the environmental context: "In some respects, negotiated
rulemaking cannot fail. At the very least, conflicts can be clarified, data
shared, and differences aired in a constructive way. Even if a full
consensus is not achieved, the negotiation process may still have narrowed
the issues in dispute. 3 9 In contrast to the divisiveness created by the
nonunanimous settlement process, a unanimity rule encourages a process
in which collaboration is a goal. At the very least, those parties who have
reached an understanding on certain issues may present at the hearings
joint positions for the commission to formally consider. Even after
negotiations break down, discussions may continue in the shadow of
formal hearings, possibly leading to an eventual unanimous
agreement. 390
Many commissions already have rules to protect the process from
intervention by parties who represent no cognizable interest or who have
no intent to participate. The procedural rules of many commissions
provide that an intervenor must have or represent "a justiciable interest
which may be adversely affected by the outcome of the proceeding,"
require the timely submission of specific position statements by
intervenors on issues in the case, and compel them to accept the status of
the record at the time of the intervention.3 9 Such rules may be used to
exclude any latecomer whose primary purpose is to scuttle a negotiated
settlement.
If these rules prove to be insufficient, there is certainly no
impediment to the adoption of reasonable regulations limiting intervention
to parties who will "fairly and adequately" represent the interests of
particular customer classes.392 Several commissions now consider the
range of interests represented by the parties in evaluating the
reasonableness of nonunanimous settlements.3 93 This same kind of

389. Susskind & McMahon, supra note 194, at 159.
390. See Richardson, supra note 104, at 45-46 (describing New Mexico rate case
where parties settled after pre-hearing negotiations failed).
391. See, e.g., IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 170, r. 1-1-9 (1994); TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit.
16, § 22.103 (1994).
392. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
393. See supra notes 357-364 and accompanying text.

The Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 12:257, 1995

analysis could be conducted at the intervention stage of the case without
as significant a danger that the decision will be tainted by the unprincipled
desire for a speedy settlement of the case.3 94
Finally, even if intervention rules will not effectively address the
problem of the intransigent intervenor, the potential for delay is not that
great. In twenty-four reported decisions, the holdout party was never a
lone discontented ratepayer or disgruntled utility employee. Not one
empirical study of settlements in the public utility ratemaking area has
identified blackballers. Although such parties certainly exist, commissions
should balance the danger of an intransigent intervenor against the
numerous problems of nonunanimous settlement. Unless blackballers
pervade commission proceedings, the advantages of an inclusionary
process through the unanimity rule outweigh its disadvantages.
Conclusion
In the late nineteenth century, the formal procedures of traditional
rate base ratemaking were established to protect the rights of utility
investors. Nearly a century later, consumer groups have used these same
procedures to safeguard their own interests. Relying on traditional
ratemaking procedures, consumer groups actively intervened in cases,
pressed commissions to conduct serious inquiries into the prudence of
utility expenditures, sought equitable allocation of rates, and appealed
adverse decisions to the courts. As a result, cases that were once relatively
simple proceedings became lengthy endeavors, taxing commission time
and resources.
Commissions then began to experiment with negotiated settlements.
Faced with strong consumer participation, many commissions decided that
the only practical way to expedite cases was to allow nonunanimous
settlements, even if consumer intervenors objected. To protect against
abuse, commissions held hearings on these settlements, reviewing their
reasonableness under a public interest standard. They have supplemented
traditional rate base ratemaking with a new kind of flexible ratemaking.

394. Although commissions could be prone to limiting intervention for the purpose
of expediting the cases, intervenors would have more protection under this approach than
under the present nonunanimous settlement process. The issue on judicial review of a denial
of a motion to intervene would not be the broad issue of the reasonableness of the settlement,
but the narrow one of the validity of the denial. Faced with the potential for judicial review
of its intervention decisions, commissions would most likely continue a liberal intervention
policy for legitimate intervenors.
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This divergence from formal procedures, when all parties have not
consented to the settlement, creates problems, especially for less powerful
consumer groups. Formalism has helped to protect the rights of ratepayers
in recent years and has been an effective tool in reining in utility power
in commission proceedings. By allowing only the utility to veto an
agreement, the nonunanimous settlement process dilutes the force of the
threat of formal proceedings. No longer must the utility bargain entirely
in the shadow of the law. Consumers run the risk that the utility will form
alliances with the commission staff, industrial intervenors, or large
commercial intervenors and then gain commission approval. Indeed, in
over eighty percent of the reported nonunanimous settlement decisions,
a consumer group was not a signatory.
Although many of these cases arose in the context of rate treatment
for large utility construction projects, a number of lessons for future cases
can be drawn from them. While the nonunanimous settlement process is
more efficient than traditional adjudication, the process has the potential
for accentuating power imbalances in negotiations and creating a
perception of unfairness in decision-making. This process may not
necessarily advance cooperative relationships among the parties and may
not promote formal declarations of policy on fundamental issues.
In this age of deregulation, these lessons are significant for captive
ratepayers, who seek protection through ratemaking proceedings from
utility attempts to shift costs to captive ratepayers in a competitive
marketplace. A unanimity rule protects against some of the problems of
the nonunanimous settlement process. It helps to maintain a balance of
power among the parties. It promotes a perception of fairness in the
decision-making process of commissions and utilities. It increases the
possibility that commissions will render significant policy decisions. Most
importantly, a unanimity rule helps to establish an environment where
collaboration is promoted. Although compared to formal adjudication, a
unanimity rule may not significantly decrease the time and resources
expended on a case, and in some cases may allow an intransigent
intervenor to block an agreement, in the long run it may foster
cooperation among the parties. Faced with the reality that they are
required to muster unanimous consent and that they may be involved in
other proceedings in the future, parties will be encouraged to brainstorm
creative solutions to their problems. Unlike the nonunanimous settlement
process, which has the potential for creating power imbalances and
harmful alliances, a unanimity rule provides commissions with a legitimate
ADR mechanism.

